Epidemiological Study on BSE Outbreak in Japan

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ABSTRACT. The aim of this study is to identify, as hypotheses, all feasible sources and routes of infection for the BSE cases in Japan, and to study the probability of each hypothesis. The strategy of this epidemiological study is as follows. 1) BSE risk status in Japan is tentatively divided into 3 stages, i.e., before 1994, after 1994 but before 2000, and after 2000. 2) Make hypotheses depending on the invasive risk scenarios and propagation risk of BSE in Japan, and they are checked by evidences, case control study or statistics. 3) Grouping of BSE cattle was conducted time sequentially and spatially; that is Group-A (1995–96, born in Hokkaido, Kanto), Group-B (1999 in Kyushu), Group-C (1999–2001 in Hokkaido), Group-D (young cattle born after real feed ban) and Pre-A, Post-D groups. As a result, a milk replacer was considered one of the most probable cause of group-A contamination, and group-C outbreak might be caused by an indigenous BSE propagation of group-A in Hokkaido. If the hypothesis of Holland animal fat as causative material was accepted, however, there are several unexplainable points. Collection of scientific evidences on animal fat impurity and age dependent susceptibility to BSE will be needed to clarify the true causative material.

KEY WORDS: BSE, counter measures, epidemiology, risk scenario, vCJD


1 GENERAL ASPECT OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY IN JAPAN

The total number of cattle reared in Japan is about 4.4 million and they are consisted of dairy cow, beef cattle, and hybrid cattle. Among them, as for a breeding purpose, 2.7 million heads are beef cattle and 1.7 million are dairy cow. Distribution of these cattle species is different in areas, i.e., in the north island (in Hokkaido), one-third of cattle in Japan are reared, and two-third of them is dairy cow. Actually, 860,000 heads are dairy cow and 450,000 heads are beef cattle in Hokkaido. On the contrary, in the south island (Kyushu), about one-third of cattle in Japan are fed, and 87% are beef cattle and only 13% are dairy cow. Thus, in Kyushu 158,000 heads are dairy cow and 1,089,000 heads are beef cattle (data on 2005). The number of dairy cow in Japan was decreased by 400,000 but that of beef cattle was increased by 100,000 over the recent decade. Besides in Hokkaido, the rate of beef cattle is higher than that of dairy cow (in Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku-Shikoku and Kyushu).

The sum of new born cattle in Japan is about 1.5 million and they are 600,000–700,000 Holstein species, 300,000–400,000 hybrid cattle, and 500,000 Japanese black cattle. Every year, 15,000–25,000 heads are imported from foreign countries, mainly from Australia.

The total number of slaughtered cattle is 1.2–1.3 million per year, and the fallen stocks (> 24 months of age) in farm are about 90,000–100,000 head of cattle per year. The male Holstein species is slaughtered around 20 months of age, and female one is mainly slaughtered at 3–9 years old after several deliveries. The hybrid cattle of both sexes are slaughtered around 25 months of age and Japanese black cattle of both sexes are slaughtered 27–32 months of age.

The survival curve of the dairy cow in Japan is estimated as follows. About 330,000 dairy cows are born every year and die by 35,000 heads within one year. From 2 to 8 years of age, about 15,000–35,000 heads are slaughtered, and in the farm 9,000–12,000 heads are died from 2 to 7 years of age in every year. Therefore, the number of the survival dairy cow at 4.5 years old is about 200,000 heads, and 100,000 heads at 7 years old, 10,000 heads at 11.5 years old, and about 500 heads at 15 years old, respectively.

Fig. 1. General aspects of animal husbandry in Japan.
2 EXPANSION AND TRANSMISSION OF BSE AND vCJD

Chronologically, the BSE outbreaks are separated into three categories in the world. They are in the UK, EU and other countries. BSE might be emerged in early 1980s in the UK, and first identified on 1986 and then confirmed in the general meeting of the OIE (Office de International Epizootics; World Animal Health Organization) on 1988. Meat and bone meal (MBM) including greaves was considered as a causative material by the epidemiological studies done in the UK [5] and the materials were banned to be used for animal feed as early as 1988. The specified risk material (SRM: SBO; specified bovine offal) was removed from the food chain in the end of 1989. During this time, live cattle and the extra MBM were exported from the UK to the EU, mostly. The feed ban was relatively effective, and BSE positive cases were peaked in 1992 and 1993, and gradually decreased later. However, in 1996, new variant Creutzfeldt Jacob Diseases (vCJD) were confirmed and considered to be derived from consumption of BSE infected meat (mainly MRM: machinery recovery meat), and it induced a world threatening panic. The UK government decided to start a measure of incineration of over thirty month cattle (OTM), and both exportation ban and real feed ban of MBM. From 1996 to 2000, 4.5 million cattle were burned and the UK succeeded to contain the BSE. In 2005, OTM regulation was relaxed to the BSE screening test in the slaughterhouse.

The EU countries recognized the risk of BSE and stopped importation of MBM from the UK on 1990, and as a result extra MBM of the UK was exported to Asia, America, and East European countries. The EU started a feed ban on 1994 and extra MBM was exported to other countries too. BSE contamination in the EU might be peaked during 1995 and 1996. In 2000, the EU started the active surveillance (rapid BSE test of cattle in the fallen stock and slaughterhouse), and introduced the real feed ban on 2001. In 2002, BSE positive cases detected by the active surveillance became a peak, and rapidly decreased later. In 2006, the EU accepted the deregulation of OTM of the UK, and started a re-importation of UK beef.

The third group, such as Japan, North America and East European countries etc., which imported live cattle, MBM or greaves from the UK and EU, were involved in BSE outbreak later than 2000 and detection of BSE cattle are still continuing now.

BSE positive cases reported in the World at 2007 January were as follows. The UK had more than 180,000 cases and the number is extremely high, and three EU countries, Ireland, Portugal, and France, detected 1,000 to 1,500 BSE cat-

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**Fig. 2.** Survival curve of dairy cow in Japan.

**Fig. 3.** Background of BSE outbreak in the world.
BSE EPIDEMIOLOGY IN JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>184,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spain, Germany and Switzerland reported about 500 cases, and Italy, Belgium and Holland had about 100 cases. Japan reported 31 BSE cases, but now in October 2007, the number is 33. The total number of countries with BSE positive cases in the world is now 25.

Case reports of vCJD were a bit different from those of BSE. The UK had 164 patients at 2007 January, and they were relatively young (20 to 30 years old). In France, the number of BSE was not so high (about 1,000) when compared with the UK (180,000) and Ireland (1,600) or Portugal (1,000), but number of the vCJD patient was high, 21 cases, when compared with Ireland (4) and Portugal (1). Moreover, the age of patients is older (30 to 40 years old) than that of the vCJD in the UK. There are several possibilities on a high frequency of vCJD in France. That is a large quantity of contaminated meat product importation such as machinery recovery meat (MRM) from the UK, or dietary culture of the calf brain consumption. The total number of countries with vCJD patients in the world is now 11. From 2003, the vCJD entered into a new phase in the UK i.e., transmission of vCJD by blood transfusion was reported, and 4 cases were detected in the UK until now.

Thus, from 1986, it was cleared that BSE transmitted from cattle to cattle by MBM (including greaves) in the feed, and one full blown BSE cattle was considered to have an infectivity titer of 4,160 CoID$_{50}$ from the calf infection experiments by the EFSA (European Food Safety Authority) [1]. And complete feed ban, that is incineration of SRM, is the most effective measure. On the contrary, incomplete feed ban such as a ban of ruminant MBM to supply to ruminants, results in the cross contamination (cc). For example if one full blown BSE cattle, which has 4,160 CoID$_{50}$ infectivity was rendered by the ordinary methods (1 bar, about 60 min), the infectivity titer reduced to $x 0.1$ (by rendering), and probable quantity of the cross contamination is $x 0.005=2.1$ BSE cattle. It means one infected full blown BSE cattle might produce 2 positive cases by rendering within a mean incubation period.

From 1996, vCJD cases transmitted by consumption of the SRM of BSE cattle were reported. The first epidemics, in which the people with the prion gene of the codon 129 with Met/Met homozygote were involved, was a peak in 2000 to 2001 and then the number reduced. The SRM elimination from food chain is a principle countermeasure, and an elimination of BSE cattle which were born before the real feed ban by the BSE test in slaughterhouse is also effective.

From 2003, transmission of vCJD by blood transfusion was reported of 4 cases in the UK. In the case of BSE in cattle, the prion is restricted to the central nervous system or neuronal tissues, except for distal ileum. But, in the case of vCJD, the prion may be exist not only nervous tissues but also lymphoid tissues and blood circulation. By the Fisher's Exact Test comparing rate of infection after transfusion from vCJD (4 cases vs. 14) and CJD donors (zero vs. 116) suggests a statistically significance of the association of the value in two groups (<1% likelihood). It suggested that vCJD is more easily transmitted than ordinal CJD, which had been known to cause the iatrogenic infection.
3 LIST OF BSE POSITIVE CASES IN JAPAN

The total number of all aged cattle examined by the BSE test in the slaughterhouse from 2001 October to 2007 October is 7,446,809 heads and 20 BSE positive cases are reported. They are 2, 4, 3, 3, 5, and 1 case from 2001 to 2007 fiscal year, respectively. On the other hand, sum of fallen stocks examined by the BSE test from 2003 April to 2007 July is 365,177 heads and 12 BSE positive cases are reported (the first case of BSE in Japan at 2001 September which was found in a farm, was excluded from this surveillance record). They are 1, 2, 3, 5, and 1 case from 2003 to 2007 fiscal year, respectively.

The 33 BSE positive cases reported in Japan until 2007 October were divided into 6 groups by a temporal and spatial difference, and BSE types (typical or atypical).

The Pre-A-group is one case of Japanese black, female beef cattle which was born in the Iki, a very small island of Nagasaki prefecture (Kyushu) in 1992 February. She was the atypical BSE and detected 169 months old of age. This case might be independent from the outbreak of other typical BSE groups in Japan. Recently, the prion of this case was confirmed to be transmissible to the knock-in mice with bovine prion gene (the mouse with prion gene knocked out was introduced of the bovine prion gene: Tg bov) [2].

The A-group consisted of 13 typical BSE cases, and the characteristics of this group is as follows; they might be involved in a concentrated BSE contamination for a very short term and all the dairy cow (Holstein species) were born before or just after the administrative guidance for feed ban in 1996 April. The 10 cases in Hokkaido were born from 1996 February to August, and 3 cases in Kanto were born from 1995 December to 1996 March.

The B-group is one case of Holstein dairy cow which was born 1999 July in Kumamoto prefecture (Kyushu). She was the typical BSE case and no direct relation was considered with Pre-A-group cattle born in Nagasaki prefecture (Kyushu). British dairy cow and Italian MBM were imported to Kyushu area and it may be a cause of this case.

The C-group is now going to be a peak of BSE detection age. Until now, 16 cases were reported. The characteristics of this group are the all cattle were typical BSE and born exclusively in Hokkaido during 1999 August to 2001 August, before when the real feed ban was started (2001 October). The 15 cases were Holstein dairy cow and one case was female beef cattle of the Japanese black which was reared with dairy cow in the same farm by a compound management. Thus, she consumed the same milk replacer, calf starter and the mixed feed as the dairy cow.

The D-group consisted of 2 male young cattle of Holstein species and both animals were born just after the real feed ban on 2001 October. One was born at 2001 October in Tochigi prefecture (Kanto) and became BSE test positive on 23 months old of age. He was diagnosed as an atypical BSE case. The other animal was born at 2002 January in Hyogo prefecture (Kansai) and became positive on 21 months old of age. He was belonged to the typical BSE case. In both cases, accumulation of the prion in the obex was very little and their prion were tried to transmit to the Tg-bov for two generations by the blind passages but the results were negative [4].

The Post-D group including all cattle which were born after 2002 February, there were no BSE positive cases until 2007 October.

The following table is the list of BSE positive cases in Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>(n)</th>
<th>Birth date</th>
<th>Birth place</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iki island</td>
<td></td>
<td>No relation with A group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1995 Dec~</td>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>Holstein</td>
<td>1996 Feb to Aug in Hokkaido (3 cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1996 Aug</td>
<td>Kanto</td>
<td></td>
<td>1995 Dec to March in Kanto (3 cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All BSE cattle were born before or just after the administrative guidance for feed ban in 1996 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1999 July</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>Holstein</td>
<td>Only one case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No relation with the Nagasaki pre-A group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No direct relation with Hokkaido C group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1999 Aug~</td>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>Holstein</td>
<td>Holstein 15 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2001 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese black</td>
<td>Japanese black 1 case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Dairy cow and beef cattle were reared in the same farm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All cattle were born before real feed ban on 2001 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2001 Oct</td>
<td>Tochigi</td>
<td>Holstein</td>
<td>Juvenile (23 M), atypical case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2002 Jan</td>
<td>Hyogo</td>
<td>Holstein</td>
<td>Juvenile (21 M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>They were born just after real feed ban on 2001 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-D</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>After 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 5. Grouping of BSE positive cattle.
4 BSE SAFE GUARD POLICY AND COUNTERMEASURES OF BSE IN JAPAN

After the first case of BSE was detected in Chiba prefecture (Kanto), consumers were led into a very big panic. The reason is that they lost trust to the government and others as follows. There was distrust to the government because MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture Forest and Fishery) made a misunderstanding of the risk of BSE invasion, a lacking crisis measures, and no risk communication. Consumer gave a strong claim to the cattle breeder too, because they used MBM as cannibalism for cattle, and gave a priority to the economy rather than food safety. At the same time, the meat importer and processor conducted false applications for the compensation buying of the domestic beef by the MAFF, and false tags of meat in the course of the distribution in beef markets were also disclosed. Every day TV and newspapers mediated noisy but less signal information (low SN ratio). And finally, consumers distrusted the scientist who denied ZERO-risk and showed a scientific uncertainty, because majority of people believed that science is almighty, can explain everything and ensure safety. Thus, the consumers had an anxiety when they faced a scientific uncertainty.

Japanese government's policy of safe guard for BSE was consisted of three elements. The first is the SRM measures. The SRM of all aged cattle including the brain, trigeminal ganglia, spinal cord, vertebral column containing dorsal root ganglia, distal ileum, and tonsil/lingual tonsil are removed from food chain and incinerated. Besides SRM, other parts which are not used for human-consumption are rendered into MBM and incinerated, too. Thus, complete feed ban was performed. The second is BSE test which purposed surveillance of BSE on all fallen stock >24 month old and screening of BSE cattle in the slaughterhouse >21 month old. The third is traceability system. All cattle are identified by ear tag number with 10 digits and registered in the national control center in production level. A small portion of the all cattle meat from carcasses was stocked for the DNA diagnosis and 10 digits were displayed in the market or meat restaurants. This is the beef traceability from the slaughterhouse to the markets in the distribution level. The 10 digit can be traced by a personal phone or internet.

Another government policy introduced after BSE outbreak in Japan is separation of risk assessment and management; that is an introduction of risk analysis system on food safety. Risk analysis consists of three elements, i.e., risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. In Japan, risk assessment is done neutrally and scientifically in Food Safety Commission (FSC) of the Cabinet Office. The purpose is scientific assessment of hazards for human health. On the other hand, risk management is conducted politically by MAFF or MHLW (Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare). The purpose is making a standard or regulation based on the risk assessment with considering risk benefit or cost benefit. Risk communication is an exchange of information or opinion about the risk by all stake holders and it is performed by the public comments and risk communication meetings.

Although there occurred a nationwide panic among consumers after the first BSE case, the activities of three organizations (MAFF, MHLW, FSC) has been successful in obtaining confidence or trust of consumers relatively short time. As for the countermeasures, in 1996 the MAFF started BSE surveillance test of the risk animals, and the TSE including BSE was involved in the notification diseases in 1997. After the first case of BSE, complete feed ban for the use of MBM, removal of SRM and BSE test in the slaughterhouse had been obligated (2001 October). In addition, BSE-related risk is assessed by the Prion Expert Committee, Food Safety Commission, in the Cabinet Office since July 2003. Then, introduction of traceability system, and several BSE related risk assessments were conducted [3].

Basic strategy of the risk management for BSE in Japan is importation ban of MBM, live cattle and beef from the countries where BSE has been detected. Cattle are grown with the feed produced in the completely isolated facility from those producing pig or poultry feed in order to avoid cross contamination. In the farm, all cattle are identified by the traceability system and fallen stock in the farm over than 24 month old is BSE tested. In the slaughter house BSE test is conducted to over than 21 month old cattle by the law (cost of the BSE test for cattle younger than 20 months old, however, is covered by the national budget during three years; from 2005 August to 2008 July) and the positive cattle is incinerated. The SRM is removed from all cattle regardless of the result of BSE test and incinerated. Both the slaughterhouse and meat processing facilities are completely separated between cattle and pig meat to avoid cross contamination. Non human-consumption materials from cattle are rendered and finally incinerated.

Thus, containment of the BSE risk is based on stopping cattle to cattle, cattle to human and human to human infections. These are MBM feed ban, control of feed production and compost regulation (cattle to cattle). BSE test and SRM removal in the slaughterhouse, and regulation for drug production using BSE free cattle materials are safeguards for cattle to human infection. Ban of blood transfusion and organ transplantation from the high risk person who stayed in the UK until 1966 or EU, is precautional to prevent human to human infection. Japan is one of the most strictly regulated countries in the measures of BSE, but we have already conducted deregulations of some measures, too. They are use of swine MBM for swine feed after complete separation of feed factory or feed producing facilities (2005) and use for fish feed (2007), after risk assessment of FSC. Liquid compost treated with high pH from cattle MBM (2004), and ash of cattle MBM or bone can be used for the compost (2005). And revision of BSE test in slaughterhouse for cattle more than 21 month old was settled in law (2005) by the assessment of FSC.
5 INVASIVE BSE RISK SCENARIOS IN JAPAN

The main work of this study is to identify, as hypotheses, all feasible sources and routes of infection for the BSE cases discovered in Japan, and to study the probability of each hypothesis. Unlike ordinary microbial infections, BSE has an extremely long incubation period for several years (mean incubation period is Ca 5 ± 1.5 years). It is technically impossible to detect genome of pathogen or antibody, and there are extremely few confirmed cases. Nevertheless these difficulties, it is hoped that these research results will be of use in preventing future outbreaks, which is the primary object of the epidemiology.

The principle and strategy of this epidemiological study of BSE in Japan are as follows. 1) BSE risk status in Japan is divided into 3 stages, i.e., before 1996 April when administrative guidance for feed ban of cattle MBM introduced. After that to 2001 September, the first case of BSE in Japan, then, after 2001 October with real feed ban in the law. 2) Make hypotheses depending on the invasive risk scenarios and propagation risk of BSE in Japan, and they are checked by evidences, case control study or statistics. 3) Grouping of BSE cattle was conducted time sequentially and spatially; that is Group-A (1995, 1996, born in Hokkaido, Kanto), Group-B (1999 born in Kyushu), Group-C (1999–2001 born in Hokkaido), Group-D (young cattle born after real feed ban) and Pre A-, Post-D groups as described above.

The risk of the BSE agent being introduced to Japan through imports of the live cattle can be divided into four scenarios. These are the 5 cattle born in southern England and imported into the Kanto region in 1982, the 9 cattle born in southern England and imported into the Kanto in 1987, the 19 cattle born in southern England and imported to Kyushu in 1988, and the 16 cattle born in Germany and imported to Hokkaido in 1993. All history of each animal in Japan is cleared. On studying the respective import lots, the origin of live cattle imports from the UK (all were dairy cow) gradually shifted from central to southern England, where BSE contamination was more intense. This study also clarifies issues such as where the cattle were reared in Japan after import, and the corresponding slaughterhouse processing after exhaustion of the reproductive cycle of them, MBM manufacturing processes, and where the cattle were re-used as MBM. In Japan, about 160 slaughterhouse and rendering factories, as well as feed factories (about 140) are relatively regional industries. Almost all animal feed were produced and consumed in local areas, for example Hokkaido feed products are 100% consumed in Hokkaido.

The risk of imported MBM is divided into three scenarios, i.e. imports from Italy, Hong Kong and Denmark. The scenarios for MBM imports from Germany or Russia were not considered, since the risk from these is thought to be extremely low. This is because the respective import volumes were small and there was hardly any manifestation of BSE among cattle produced in those countries at the time of import. In the case of Italy, 55,930 tons of Italian MBM had been imported between 1987 and 2001. Moreover, MBM imports from Italy involve a number of factors, including the state of BSE incidence in Italy, variations in the volume of MBM imported, and changes in the MBM manufacturing processes. Namely, the 656 tons imported between 1987 and 1993 (no imports in 1991 and 1992) to Yokohama (Kanto), Nagoya (Chubu) and Moji (Kyushu) were categorized as M1 (high risk), the 5,408 tons imported between 1995 and 1998 to Nagoya (Chubu), Yokohama (Kanto), Kobe (Kansai) and Kagoshima (Kyushu), of which the 4,802 tons imported after June 1998 were heat-treated at 133°C, 3 bar, 20 min as M2 (moderate risk), and the 49,846 tons imported between 1999 and 2001 to West Japan (Kyushu, Kansai, Chubu) as M3 (low risk). In the case of Denmark (BSE positive cases are only 15 on 2007 January), 30,500 tons of Danish MBM, which were processed by 133°C, 3 bar for 20 min, had been imported in 1999–2000 (low risk).

The risk of importation of animal fat and tallow is divided
into two scenarios. These are the 1,245 tons of Holland animal fat (powdered fat) imported into Kanto and Kyushu between 1994 and 2000, and the 22 tons of Switzerland animal fat (tallow) imported in 1989. Imported animal fats were used for producing milk replacer. In Japan, there are a few milk replacer factories and they shared broad area such as East of Japan or West of Japan.

The BSE risk status of Japan was classified tentatively into three periods as follows by the BSE risk assessment. Before 1996 April, there were no regulations for rendering and animal feed production, and the invasive risk was high because importation of live cattle from the UK was moderate, Italian MBM was high, and animal fat from Holland was very low. The stability was extremely unstable, because the rendering condition was poor (about 110°C, 1 bar, 60 min) and SRM was used for the cattle feed. Thus BSE risk status of this period is GBRIII or undetermined. The period from 1996 April to 2001 September, invasive risk was moderate because live cattle importation from U.S.A. and Canada is low, MBM imports from Italy and Denmark was moderate and animal fat from Holland was very low. The stability was unstable because partial feed ban was introduced (1996 April). Administrative guidance for feed ban of cattle MBM but SRM was still used for rendering and feed production was conducted with a condition of cross contamination. Moreover, MBM was used for a supplement in many dairy farms. Thus, BSE risk status of this period was GBRIII or undetermined. After 2001 October, the BSE risk status became low ~ negligible, because invasive risk of live cattle from U.S.A. and Canada was low, complete ban of MBM importation was negligible risk and animal fat importation from Australia was negligible risk. The stability was very stable because SRM was incinerated. Moreover, the slaughterhouse, rendering facility and feed factory were separated between cattle and pig or chicken systems avoiding the cross contamination. Thus, BSE risk status of this period is GBRI or the controlled risk.

6 CHARACTERISTICS OF BSE OUTBREAK IN JAPAN

The feature of the BSE outbreak in Japan is a bit different from those of European countries as follows. 1) Epidemic size is relatively smaller than those in European countries. Extremely intensive BSE test had been conducted in Japan and a nationwide traceability system by the MAFF was established. Thus, precise data on each BSE positive case could be listed up, and all population of cattle including healthy slaughterhouse animals (from 2001 October) and farm fallen stocks (from April 2004) were BSE tested. 2) Un-even distribution of BSE cases was observed. Until now, Hokkaido is a core of BSE epidemic in Japan, and two different time outbreaks were occurred there. 3) Dairy cow are mainly involved. And 4), Sporadic, discontinuous outbreaks were occurred temporally-spatially. That is, in 33 BSE test positive cattle in Japan, the birthplaces of 26 cases are Hokkaido and other 7 animals are born in other prefectures. If the atypical cases were eliminated (case No. 8 and 24) from the outbreak of typical BSE, 26 in 31 cases (84%) were born in Hokkaido.

Another characteristic of relatively large sized BSE outbreaks in Hokkaido is a difference of the patterns of the birth dates among cattle of the Group-A and -C. Mean and standard deviation of the A-group cattle birth date interval are 3.6 ± 1.8 months. It is concentrated in an extremely narrow period. However, those of the C-group are 10.5 ± 6.6 months until now. By the statistical analysis, it can be con-
Imported yellow grease, tallow were processed to milk replacer by two main factories, East is “Takasaki” and West is “Hyuga”, and others.

Rendering and feed production are conducted as a local industry in Japan.

\[ \text{MBM distribution by rendering of imported cattle (UK) or imported MBM (Italy)} \]

\[ \text{Mixed feed distribution} \]

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Fig. 8.

*Mean and standard deviation: A group 3.6±1.8 M, C group 10.5±6.6 M*

*Birth dates of the A- & C-groups follow the same Gaussian distribution with different parameters*

In 95% confidence interval, P (both sides examination)=0.0013

*Mean of A group is different from that of C group, significantly*

*A group outbreak is extremely concentrated*

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Fig. 9. Features of BSE outbreaks in Hokkaido.

Considered that the birth dates of the group-A and -C follow the same Gaussian distribution with different parameters. In the 95% confidence interval, P value (both sides examination) is 0.0013. It suggested that the cause of A-group might be different from that of C-group significantly, and possible contamination of A-group might be single or a few number of lots including the causative agents (BSE prion).

Spatial distribution of BSE cases in A-group Hokkaido was closely related to the milkreplacer- and feed-distribution route by the Kushiro-route. Another different characteristic between A- and C-groups is spatial husbandry background in Hokkaido. The stock raising of BSE positive area in Hokkaido was different, that is in the A-group, only beef cattle and dairy cow are reared in the areas of 9 out of
• The former half in 1996, concentrated contamination of BSE was occurred in Hokkaido (A group), then there was no BSE invasion, and indigenous propagation resulted in the group C (1999 to 2001)
• Outbreak of BSE after 2002 might be controlled (assessment can be done within several years)
• If BSE case born after 2002 is not detected, then Japan becomes the negligible risk country in 2013

![Fig. 10. Chronological and spatial prevalence of BSE.](image)

Prevalence of BSE in A-group; 10 positive: 75,000 heads (P=1.7500(population))
//If Pre-A group is identical to A-group, sample size to be needed for detection of BSE case in Pre-A group is
//Sampling size \( n = \frac{1}{1-P} (\frac{N - d^2}{1}) + 1 \)
//Population size, d: BSE case in population, P: probability to detect 1 positive case at least in the sample
//95% intervals, sample size of 1 BSE positive case is included (population is more than 10,000 heads to infinite)\n//If \( n = 7810 - 7990 \) heads (about 7,900 heads are BSE tested, 1 case becomes positive (95% confidence intervals))
//Actuary, no positive case in 56,000 heads (95% confidence, 6.6 cases become positive in the population size)

Examination of significance of the association of the value in the Group-A and Pre-A group
//10 cases positive, but 75,000 negative in the A-group
//No positive case and 56,000 negative in the Pre-A group
By \( \chi^2 \) examination
\[
\chi^2 = \frac{(d-a)\cdot d-a}{N} \cdot \frac{(a+b)(c+d)}{(a+b)(c+d)} = \frac{(56000-55000)^2}{1310000} + \frac{1310000}{1310000} \times 560000 \times 75000 \times 5.95, \chi^2 = 0.05 \ (3.84), \ 0.01(6.63) \ 95% \text{ confidence intervals: significant difference between two groups}
\]

If Fisher’s exact test is used instead of \( \chi^2 \) test, because of the cell including an expectation value being less than 5.
//The cell includes zero, \( P = \frac{n_{a}! \cdot n_{b}! \cdot n_{c}! \cdot n_{d}!}{n_{a}! + n_{b}! + n_{c}! + n_{d}!} / \frac{n_{a}! \cdot n_{b}! \cdot n_{c}! \cdot n_{d}!}{n_{a}! + n_{b}! + n_{c}! + n_{d}!} = \frac{(7501)(56000)(10)(1310000)}{1310000(750000)(10)(1310000)} \times 560000 \times 75000 = 0.00378
\]
//\( P \times 2 = 0.00756 < 0.01, \text{ thus less than } 1% \text{ likelihood, null hypothesis is rejected.}

Fig. 11. Statistical analysis.

10 BSE positive areas (pig was reared in one area, 1 out of 10 BSE cases), but in the C-group, pig and/or chicken were reared 5 out of 11 areas (8 out of 15 BSE positive cases). It suggest that the cause of contamination of the A-group might be closely correlated with only cattle, but that of C-group with pig and/or chicken breeding. Thus, Group-A contamination might be milk replacer or supplement, which is specifically used for cattle, and Group-C contamination might be cross contamination of cattle feed in the factories and/or milk replacer.

Population study on the Hokkaido dairy cows suggested followings. About 160,000 to 170,000 dairy cows are born every year in Hokkaido (half number of Japanese dairy cow) and majority of the population are slaughtered from 4 to 7 years old of age (total ~65,000 head per year). Mortality rate of the fallen stock is high during 2 to 7 years old of age (total ~30,000 head per year).

By the statistical analysis, 1), The Before-group-A (Pre-A
group, dairy cows in Hokkaido which were born before 1995 August, and there was no positive case in the BSE test; zero/56,000 tested) and Group-A (they were born from 1995 Sept. to 1996 Aug., and by the test, BSE positive cases were detected; 10/75,000 tested) are different on the BSE prevalence. It suggested that BSE contamination occurred suddenly at the latter half of 1995 in Hokkaido.

2), Statistically Group-A and Post-group-A (they were born from 1996 Sept. to 1999 July, and by the test, zero/240,000 tested) are different on BSE prevalence. It suggested that during 1997 and 1998 there were neither BSE invasion nor propagation in Hokkaido.

3), Statistically Post-group-A and Group-C (they were born from 1999 August to 2001 October, and by the test, BSE positive cases were detected; 15/143,000 tested) are different on BSE prevalence. It suggested that Group-C outbreak might be induced by BSE propagation in Hokkaido (from Group-A). It is because spatial overlapping of the positive cases in Groups-A and -C was observed, no BSE case was detected in the cattle born during Post-A period (1997 and 1998), and the interval between Group-A and -C might be consistent with the BSE incubation period. Other than Hokkaido (in Kanto and Kyushu), indigenous propagation of BSE was not detected by the extensive nationwide BSE surveillance until now.

Strangely, however, it is very important to point out that the invasive BSE risk into Hokkaido was very poor. That is, all the UK imported live cattle were rendered in Saga prefecture (Kyushu) and Kanagawa prefecture (Kanto), and consumed as animal feed outside of Hokkaido (mainly in Kanto, and Kyushu). There were no reports of Italian MBM importation into Hokkaido (they were imported into Kanto, Chubu, and Kyushu). The Germany live cattle were rendered in Hokkaido, but it was occurred later than 1996 (after the A-group outbreak in Hokkaido) and the MBM used in the Hokkaido feed factory from 1995 April, was derived from Hokkaido cattle at that time. Thus it may be impossible that the MBM produced at that time (the latter half of 1995) was contaminated by BSE prion in Hokkaido. On the contrary, all BSE cattle of the A-group drunk the same milkreplacer made of Holland animal fat (Hokkaido 10 cases, and Kanto 3 cases).

7 BSE CONTAMINATION SCENARIO AND ITS CONTRADICTION

The hypothesis that animal fat imported from Holland from 1995 to 1996 being a causative agent, is examined by a case control study. The farms of Group-A (in Hokkaido and Kanto) and control cases (population control), which were randomly sampled as 200 farms from 20,000 dairy farms in the East of Japan where the milk replacer made from Holland animal fat might be used. The randomness of the selected farms was confirmed by statistics. As a result, the concerned milkreplacer shared about 30% in Hokkaido at that time. The case control study resulted in 1% significance on P<0.0001, odds ratio=39.3, and 95% confidence intervals (4.9-312.9), suggesting that the hypothesis is statistically significant. The same results was obtained by the comparison of expectation value and actual value using milkreplacer of the corresponding factory (Pure milk / Milfood-A-Super made of Holland animal fat) and BSE positive case in Hokkaido. Whether the A-group being independent or not was examined (share of the milkreplacer was in Hokkaido=30 %), and it was statistically significant (p=0.00001).

When compared feeding history of the Group-A and Group-C cattle, the factory of the milk replacer for Group-A was common, and other feed such as calf starter and mixed feed were not produced in the same factory. In the case of Group-C, not only milk replacer but also calf starter and mixed feed were produced by various factories.

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Case control study. Group A Hokkaido, Kanto and control farms (population control) randomly sampled 200 farms from 20,000 dairy farms in East Japan and the randomness was confirmed by statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case control study</th>
<th>BSE</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case (Takasaki)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control (Others)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1% significance P=0.0001 Odds=39.3 95% intervals (4.9-312.9)

---

Using milk replacer of "Takasaki" (Pure milk/ Milfood Asup) and BSE positive case in Hokkaido A group are independent or not (Share in Hokkaido=30%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation value</th>
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<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16497</td>
<td>38493</td>
<td>54990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16500</td>
<td>38500</td>
<td>55000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual value</th>
<th>Takasaki</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>16490</td>
<td>38590</td>
<td>55090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16500</td>
<td>38500</td>
<td>55000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 12. Statistical analysis.
In deed, the record of animal fat importation from Holland (shipping days in 1995, 1996) confirmed that the 1st lot was 1995 July 15, 2nd lot 1995 September 29, 3rd lot 1995 December 9, and 4th lot 1996 January 29, respectively. In the corresponding factory, the milkreplacer was produced from 1996 January and February (Pure milk, and Milkfood-A) from the 2nd lot which was arrived at 1996 December, and transported to the East of Japan. The Hokkaido A-group dairy cows were born from 96 February to 96 August and in Kanto from 95 December to 96 March. The maximum term of validity on the milkreplacer may be about 6 months after production. Thus, if 2nd lot was contaminated, all dairy cows might drink the same milkreplacer of this lot.

Thus, the circumstantial evidences suggested that the milkreplacer containing Holland animal fat might be the cause of A-group outbreak in Hokkaido and Kanto on 1995 and 1996. The Holland epidemiological study reported on the animal fat as follows. There were possibilities that fatty tissues surrounding intestine including the nervous tissues and the ileum which might be infected with BSE prion, were rendered at that time. There was possibility, when collecting the skull and spinal cord for rendering, the CNS was contaminated, all dairy cows might drink the same milkreplacer of this lot.

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included in them. It was sure that the SRM removal was not obligated before 1997 (first BSE case was detected) and nervous tissues might be included. Rendering fat should be ruled containing less than 0.15% impurities, however, before it was ruled as 0.5%. On the contrary, fancy tallow had less than 0.02% impurities.

If the hypothesis of Hollan animal fat as causative material was accepted, there are several unexplainable points. By the EFSA evaluation, one full blown BSE cattle is considered to have an infectivity titer of 4160 (if only the nervous tissues was used for rendering, infectivity titer is 3750) ColD$_{30}$. When one adult cattle is rendered, resultant 65 kg MBM may contain 32.8 kg protein, and 13.5 kg yellow grease of 0.5% impurities may contain 35 g protein. Theoretical MBM infectivity by the ordinal rendering method (about 110°C, 1 bar, 60 min) with cross contamination on 1995 in Holland is 2.01 ColD$_{30}$ (3739 × 1 × 0.1 × 0.005 = 2.01). On the other hand, theoretical animal fat infectivity at that time in Japan may be 0.37 ColD$_{30}$ (3.8×10×0.1×0.01×0.97 = 0.37). Therefore, the contaminated milk replacer lot had to be made of 54–81 full blown BSE cattle theoretically in order to induce A-group outbreak (about 20–30 cases), provided the worst scenario was accepted (impurity of the animal fat was 0.5%, including the central nervous system and other nervous tissues such as ganglia). By the Hollan epidemiology, however, such kind of high dose of BSE contamination could not be occurred. Probably there are missed risk factors in this estimation, such as un-homogeneous protein impurity in the animal fat or higher content of SRM in animal fat occasionally, and high intestinal absorption of neonatal cattle (<1 month old) than the calf which are used for the experimental infection (3–6 months old). Collection of scientific evidences relating these possibilities will be needed to clarify the true causative material.

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