社会的交換における裏切り者検知

• 山岸 俊男

  北海道大学文学部行動システム科学講座

• 小杉 素子

  電力中央研究所

書誌事項

タイトル別名

• Cheater Detection in Social Exchange

抄録

Three experiments investigated accuracy of discerning defectors from cooperators in one-shot prisoner's dilemma games. The prisoner's dilemma games were constructed in a manner that represented a typical social exchange situation. Overall, participants who were classmates and had known each other fairly well for the last few months failed to discern, better than chance, who cooperated and who defected in the prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, it was shown that high-trusters were more accurate in cheater detection when the game was played anonymously, whereas those who were high in social anxiety were more accurate when the game was played between mutually identified players. The latter type of participants were also more accurate in judging the nature of interpersonal relations (who liked whom) in their class. Those findings were interpreted to represent two types of adaptive strategy for those who faces socially uncertain situations.

収録刊行物

• 認知科学

  認知科学 6 (2), 179-190, 1999

  日本認知科学会

キーワード

• 囚人のジレンマ
• 社会的交換
• 裏切り者検知
• 社会的不確実性

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390001204483119616
• NII論文ID: 10009704912
• NII書誌ID: AN1047304X
• DOI: 10.11225/jcss.6.179
• ISSN: 18815995
• ISSN: 13417924
• 本文言語コード: ja
• データソース種別:
  • JaLC
  • CiNii Articles
• 抄録ライセンスフラグ: 使用不可