現在主義・時制・Truthmaker Presentism, Tense, and Truthmaker

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抄録

In this paper, I try to defend Presentism. First of all, I explore how Presentism diverges to its versions and show that none of them, which include the currently standard Presentism that invokes tense logic, are tenable. Next, I point out that some philosophers argue that by replacing the Quinean criterion of existence with the Truthmaker Principle, another version of Presentism, which invokes tensed properties, can emerges. However, this version has a highly implausible conclusion. Finally, I argue that it can be avoided by taking the evidences of the past or future truths to be typical truthmakers of them.

収録刊行物

  • 科学基礎論研究

    科学基礎論研究 34(2), 49-59, 2007-03-25

    JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

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各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    10018919277
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN00036945
  • 本文言語コード
    JPN
  • 資料種別
    ART
  • ISSN
    02227668
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    8838086
  • NDL 雑誌分類
    ZM4(科学技術--科学技術一般--自然科学)
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z14-80
  • データ提供元
    CJP書誌  NDL  J-STAGE 
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