現在主義・時制・Truthmaker Presentism, Tense, and Truthmaker
In this paper, I try to defend Presentism. First of all, I explore how Presentism diverges to its versions and show that none of them, which include the currently standard Presentism that invokes tense logic, are tenable. Next, I point out that some philosophers argue that by replacing the Quinean criterion of existence with the Truthmaker Principle, another version of Presentism, which invokes tensed properties, can emerges. However, this version has a highly implausible conclusion. Finally, I argue that it can be avoided by taking the evidences of the past or future truths to be typical truthmakers of them.
科学基礎論研究 34(2), 49-59, 2007-03-25
JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE