Presentism, Tense, and Truthmaker

• KOYAMA Tora

  JSPS Keio University

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• 現在主義・時制・Truthmaker
• ゲンザイ シュギ ジセイ Truthmaker

Abstract

In this paper, I try to defend Presentism. First of all, I explore how Presentism diverges to its versions and show that none of them, which include the currently standard Presentism that invokes tense logic, are tenable. Next, I point out that some philosophers argue that by replacing the Quinean criterion of existence with the Truthmaker Principle, another version of Presentism, which invokes tensed properties, can emerges. However, this version has a highly implausible conclusion. Finally, I argue that it can be avoided by taking the evidences of the past or future truths to be typical truthmakers of them.

Journal

• Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science

  Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 34 (2), 49-59, 2007

  Japan Association for Philosophy of Science

Details

• CRID: 1390282680300463488
• NII Article ID: 10018919277
• NII Book ID: AN00036945
• DOI: 10.4288/kisoron1954.34.49
• ISSN: 18841236
• ISSN: 00227668
• NDL BIB ID: 8838086
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I8838086
• Text Lang: ja
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • NDL
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed