Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks

• SHIN SeongHan

  Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) Chuo University

• KOBARA Kazukuni

  Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) Chuo University

• IMAI Hideki

  Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) Chuo University

抄録

An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. In INDOCRYPT2008, Yang and Zhang [26] proposed a new anonymous PAKE (NAPAKE) protocol and its threshold (D-NAPAKE) which they claimed to be secure against insider attacks. In this paper, we first show that the D-NAPAKE protocol [26]is completely insecure against insider attacks unlike their claim. Specifically, only one legitimate client can freely impersonate any subgroup of clients (the threshold t>1) to the server. After giving a security model that captures insider attacks, we propose a threshold anonymous PAKE (called, TAP++) protocol which provides security against insider attacks. Moreover, we prove that the TAP++ protocol has semantic security of session keys against active attacks as well as insider attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and provides client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. Finally, several discussions are followed: 1) We also show another threshold anonymous PAKE protocol by applying our RATIONALE to the non-threshold anonymous PAKE (VEAP) protocol [23]; and 2) We give the efficiency comparison, security consideration and implementation issue of the TAP++ protocol.

収録刊行物

• IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems

  IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems E94-D (11), 2095-2110, 2011

  一般社団法人 電子情報通信学会

キーワード

• password-authenticated key exchange
• passwords
• on-line/off-line dictionary attacks
• anonymity
• insider attacks
• provable security

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390282679356521472
• NII論文ID: 10030193736
• NII書誌ID: AA10826272
• DOI: 10.1587/transinf.e94.d.2095
• ISSN: 17451361
• ISSN: 09168532
• Web Site: http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/transinf/E94.D/11/E94.D_11_2095/_pdf
• 本文言語コード: en
• データソース種別:
  • JaLC
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• 抄録ライセンスフラグ: 使用不可