情報開示の強制と企業のインセンティヴ
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- 康 聖一
- 日本福祉大学
書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES
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This paper examines the economic role of mandatory disclosure in a noisy rational expectations model. Many theoretical studies of discretionary disclosure suggest that firms never have the incentive to spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal and offer no support for mandatory disclosure regulations.<br>This paper, however, derives the paradoxical result that mandatory disclosure may increase the social surplus even when firms have the incentive to spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal. The reason is that mandatory disclosure may increase the cost of disclosing too much information and discourage firms from making this overdisclosure decision.
収録刊行物
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- The Economic Studies Quarterly
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The Economic Studies Quarterly 43 (3), 258-265, 1992
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1570009751890572800
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- NII論文ID
- 110000372356
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00266049
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- ISSN
- 0557109X
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- CiNii Articles