積極的安楽死と消極的安楽死(II) : 「殺すこと」と「死ぬに任せること」

書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • Positive and Negative Euthanasia (II) : Killing and Letting Die

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抄録

This paper examines three main objections raised against James Rachels' claim that the distinction between killing and letting die has no moral significance. The first objection, which is based upon a rule-utilitarian position, holds that the current moral rules forbidding active killing have the highest “utility value" in the structure of our present moral code and therefore should not be abandoned. The second objection focuses on the interpretation of the AMA statement which Rachels attacks in his argument, and says that he misunderstands the statement because it does not concern itself with the distinction as he supposes. The third objection, which Philippa Foot makes, appeals to the concept of virtue. According to the objection, the killing / letting-die distinction is morally relevant because an unjustified act of killing is contrary to “justice" whereas an unjustified act of letting die is contrary to “charity".

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詳細情報 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1050282677793546752
  • NII論文ID
    110000490258
  • NII書誌ID
    AN10012262
  • ISSN
    09101233
  • Web Site
    http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4688
  • 本文言語コード
    ja
  • 資料種別
    journal article
  • データソース種別
    • IRDB
    • CiNii Articles

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