Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist

• KANAZAKI Masayuki

  Kyushu University, Graduate School of Economics

抄録

This paper presents an examination of a lobbying game between a government with informational superiority and a special interest group (SIG), which is a lobbyist. This informational superiority of the government allows the application of an analytical method of ordinary contract theory in this game. Results of these analyses show that, for a SIG whose population is sufficiently small, although the government has informational superiority to the SIG, the government is unable to prevent the SIG from distorting policy excessively by endowing a political contribution to the government. However, for a SIG whose population is sufficiently large, the government’s informational superiority can stanch the SIG inducement of a larger policy by endowing a political contribution to the government. In this case, government disclosure is not always socially desirable.

収録刊行物

• Interdisciplinary Information Sciences

  Interdisciplinary Information Sciences 11 (1), 49-58, 2005

  東北大学大学院情報科学研究科ジャーナル編集委員会

キーワード

• lobby
• informational superiority
• political contribution
• information rent

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390001204438266112
• NII論文ID: 110001150597
• NII書誌ID: AA11032627
• DOI: 10.4036/iis.2005.49
• ISSN: 13476157
• ISSN: 13409050
• MRID: 2131110
• 本文言語コード: en
• データソース種別:
  • JaLC
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
• 抄録ライセンスフラグ: 使用不可