抄録
The aim of this paper is to examine the character of Hungarianforeign policy in the early Kadar-era. The author analyzes Hungary'spolicy towards Yugoslavia at a time when the Kadar-regime was pressed for an important decision for the first time since the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The author asserts that relations with Yugoslavia influenced the direction of Hungarian foreign policy in the Kadar-era. The Soviet army arrested Imre Nagy, who was the Prime Minister during the Hungarian Revolution. He took refuge at the Yugoslavian Embassy in Budapest after the Soviet military intervention on November 4, 1956. Janos Kadar, the First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, had a firm attitude towards Nagy, because Nagy had refused to negotiate with his government. Furthermore,Kadar cooperated with the Soviet Union to evacuate Nagy from the Yugoslavian Embassy and arrest him. Hungarian-Yugoslav relations deteriorated after Nagy's arrest. Kadar consolidated his hold on the country by restoring the oldsocialist system and endeavoring to keep good relations with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, he made a decision to prosecute Nagy, who had renounced one-party rule and announced a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact during the Hungarian Revolution. Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav President, and other Yugoslav leaders objected to the Nagy-trial because they feared a restoration of Stalinism in Hungary. There was a time of intense confrontation between the two countries after the execution of Laszlo Rajk, a former Hungarian Foreign Minister who falsely accused of being a Yugoslavian spy in 1949. However, Kadar made an effort to avoid the deterioration of relations with Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia recognized the Kadar-regime as a legitimate government in Hungary, which wanted Yugoslavia's support in international organizations. The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute intensified after the publication of the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in March 1958. In that document, Yugoslavia proposed active peaceful coexistence between the East and West and criticized the Soviet hegemony among socialist countries. However, Hungary criticized the Draft Program and supported the Soviet Union. Kadar and his colleagues executed Nagy on June 16, 1958, in spite of deteriorating relations with Yugoslavia. The decision to execute Nagy was rooted in the desire to follow the lead of the Soviet Union during the intense Soviet-Yugoslav dispute. Yugoslavia blamed Hungary for Nagy's execution. It was undeniable that Hungarian foreign policy in the early Kadar-era was continuous with the foreign policy before the Hungarian Revolution. In addition, the Nagy-trial was the climax of the restoration of the old socialist system and Hungary's isolation in the international community following the Hungarian Revolution. Due to their desire to support the Soviet Union, Kadar and his colleagues took the initiative to bring Nagy to trial without instruction from the Soviet Union. To restrain the Soviet Union from intervening in its internal affairs, Hungary extended the autonomy of domestic policy within the frame of the Soviet Bloc. To this end, Kadar tried to show the Soviet Union that he intended to discontinue Nagy's radical reform by executing Nagy. At the same time, Hungary denied Yugoslavia's road to socialism and foreign policy as sovereign independence. After Nagy's execution, the Kadar-regime began to relax domestic controls and began to moderate foreign policy as a means of ending its isolation in the international community.
