「寡きを患えず、均しからずを患う」? : グループの意思決定におけるパレート原理の作用 Do people pursue distributive justice over social efficiency? : The functioning of Pareto optimality in group decision making

この論文にアクセスする

この論文をさがす

著者

抄録

This paper addresses psychological dilemmas between pursuing distributive justice and sacrificing social efficiency in reward allocation. Previous research by Ohtsubo, Kameda, & Kimura (1996) showed that individuals often commit themselves to a specific distributive principle (such as equality or equity), endorsing a reward allocation scheme that is subjectively fairer but objectively inferior in terms of Pareto optimality. We have revisited this phenomenon in a reward allocation context by groups. Participants were first provided a scenario in which a group of people won a prize by collaboration, and were then asked to evaluate various reward allocation schemes as a neutral third party. Participants in the group condition discussed these schemes and made a collective recommendation in three-person groups. Participants in the individual condition made the identical decision alone. The results revealed that groups recommended a less fair, but Pareto-superior allocation scheme more often than individuals working alone. A follow-up experiment indicated that accountability of decisions to the beneficiaries underlies the enhanced role of Pareto axiom in group decision making.

収録刊行物

  • 社会心理学研究

    社会心理学研究 20(1), 26-34, 2004

    日本社会心理学会

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    110002785423
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN10049127
  • 本文言語コード
    JPN
  • ISSN
    09161503
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    7040524
  • NDL 雑誌分類
    ZE1(社会・労働--社会科学・社会思想・社会学)
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z6-2798
  • データ提供元
    NDL  NII-ELS  J-STAGE 
ページトップへ