Endogenous Timing of Price Discrimination with Technological Incompatibility (特集 日本経済と産業組織) Endogenous Timing of Price Discrimination with Technological Incompatibility

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We consider two period models in which two firms supply differentiated services and devices for using such services. The firms can discriminate between their own previous customers and other customers. We consider the standardization problem of the devices and the firms'decisions concerning when to offer discriminatory prices. We derive the following results. Standardization increases the firms'profits and social surplus but decreases the consumer surplus. Both firms offer discriminatory prices after (resp. before) the first-period consumption if their devices are incompatible and the production cost is low (resp. high). Neither of the firms offers discriminatory prices if the devices are compatible.

We consider two period models in which two firms supply differentiated services and devices for using such services. The firms can discriminate between their own previous customers and other customers. We consider the standardization problem of the devices and the firms' decisions concerning when to offer discriminatory prices. We derive the following results. Standardization increases the firms' profits and social surplus but decreases the consumer surplus. Both firms offer discriminatory prices after (resp. before) the first-period consumption if their devices are incompatible and the production cost is low (resp. high). Neither of the firms offers discriminatory prices if the devices are compatible.

収録刊行物

  • 社会科学研究

    社会科学研究 55(3・4), 65-92, 2004

    東京大学社会科学研究所

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    110004633721
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN00108966
  • 本文言語コード
    ENG
  • 資料種別
    特集
  • 雑誌種別
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    03873307
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    6961887
  • NDL 雑誌分類
    ZE1(社会・労働--社会科学・社会思想・社会学)
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z6-281
  • データ提供元
    NDL  NII-ELS  IR 
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