ポスト・ソヴィエト時代のウズベキスタンの「乞食」 : 都市下位文化におけるイスラームと共同性  [in Japanese] Beggars in Uzbekistan in the Post-Soviet Period : Islam and the Communal in Urban Subcultures  [in Japanese]

本稿は、首都タシュケントの「乞食」自身の体験を記述・分析・考察することにより、ペレストロイカとソ連解体(以下、体制転換)というウズベキスタン社会全体における大きな構造転換と都市民衆の微細な生活営為とを結んで論じることを目的とする。体制転換後のウズベキスタンでは、主に資本主義市場経済への移行に伴うマクロな構造的変化によって、「新しいウズベク人」と呼ばれる富裕層が誕生する一方、数多くの人々が突然の貧困と生活水準の低下を経験している。そうしたなか、人々は、主に親族や近隣住民たちとの間で、互助講や私的譲渡など相互扶助の網の目を維持・形成・拡大することによって、現金を決定的に欠いた厳しい現実に対処している。しかしながら、そうした生活営為の網の目から漏れた存在として、現実に「乞食」は存在する。加えて「乞食」は、ソヴィエト時代には社会主義政策のもと原則として禁止され、時に逮捕対象とさえなっていた存在であったが、現在では体制転換に伴うイデオロギー転換によって解禁された資本と宗教の接点に位置する存在として登場している。なぜなら「乞食」は、時代的な諸変化に適応できなかった経済的「敗者」だが、1989年の公式な「反イスラーム政策の停止」を大きな契機として広範に再生した宗教により、その正当性を補うことを可能としている存在だからである。本稿は、タシュケントの「乞食」の生活世界を検討することにより、ウズベキスタンにおける現在の貧困と都市社会におけるイスラーム再生の関わりを示し、都市下層の人々にとってのより日常的な共同世界のあり方を検討する。

This paper tries to argue the connection between the large structural transformation owing to perestroika and the breakup of the Soviet Union within Uzbek society, on the one hand, with the daily (trivial but important) endeavors of the urban people, on the other, by describing, analyzing and examining the experiences of beggars in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. In Uzbekistan after perestroika and the breakup of the Soviet Union, many people were plunged into sudden poverty accompanied by a decline in living standards, while a rich class - the so-called 'New Uzbeks' - also appeared thanks to the macro-structural changes that resulted from the transition to a capitalist market. In that situation, people have tried to cope with the stern realities of daily life, by dint of maintaining, shaping and extending their networks of mutual aid (mutual-aid associations, private transfers etc.), mainly with their relatives and neighbors. Still, beggars do exist in reality despite those networks. Furthermore, beggars, who had been banned as a rule and arrested under the socialist policies of the Soviet regime, also exist as a result of the crossover between capital and religion (below, Islam), owing to perestroika and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The beggars are the economic losers who could not adapt to the changing times, but at the same time have their own legitimacy, supported by the wide revival of Islam. Who, then, are the beggars in Tashkent? How do they beg, and in what situations? How do they manage to eke out a living by subsisting on alms alone? Moreover, why don't they belong to any mutual aid network? With whom do they create their own communal society, while coping with their daily lives? To answer the above questions, this paper examines, firstly, the relation between current poverty in Uzbekistan and the revival of Islam in urban society. Secondly, the auther looks at the more ordinary communal world of the urban lower classes and the condition that shape it, by investigating the actual conditions of beggars in Tashkent. I give specific examples of the former phenomenon in Chapter II, as described below: Under the Soviet regime, begging was considered a crime under the policies that stipulated modernization and banned religion. At that time, the only people begging were the loli ('gypsies') and disabled war veterans from World War II and Afghan Wars. But right before the breakup of the Soviet Union and thereafter, people from various ethnic groups (Uzbeks, Russians, etc.), especially those from the vulnerable elements of society - handicapped persons, children, women and seniors - started to beg on the streets. I restrict the subject of my investigation to the Uzbeks. I found that most come from rural provinces, regardless of gender, including the urban settlers. However, not all of them originally came to Tashkent to beg, but rather were forced to do so on account of the lack of sufficient employment and wages (even in Tashkent, where jobs and money are concentrated). Another reason is the further economic deterioration caused by the recent large-scale influx of urban population including migrant workers. Under the current situation, they try to solicit alms by actively appealing to Islamic and national values that are considered desirable in interpersonal relations, delivering a begging 'performance' and manipulating certain impressions to stimulate a compassionate response. As a result, in Tashkent, where cash is concentrated and anonymity is high, beggars can sometimes maintain a living standard that is nearly as high as that of 'ordinary' people, simply by making begging their occupation. Furthermore, the perception that being a 'beggar' can be good business is widely shared among the people, and that is another reason for its increase. On the other hand, the ideology of Islam, which sustains the life style of the beggars, is also important, with the penetration of religious norms called sadaqa (alms) following the Islamic revival that occurred right before the break-up of the Soviet Union and afterward. Actually, alms givers generally explain their motives using the logic of Islam and national values, like sawab (good deeds) etc. Namely, sadaqa, which was widely revived right before the breakup of the Soviet Union and afterwards, is significant not only because of the motives of the people who do it, but also because it forms the basis of begging. In Chapter III, I give specific examples of the latter phenomenon, as follows: For the beggars, Friday mosque prayers are important not just because they take place at the main location for begging, but also because there they can experience new encounters and weekly reunions with friends. They have created their own communal world among themselves with other people who have also personally experienced being 'marginal and inferior.' There, they present and exchange food, clothes etc., and also eat with one another and chat with friends, and so forth. But the places in which the beggars do their begging are not considered out of the ordinary. What is unusual, however, is for those friendships to extend to their residential area. Moreover, given that beggars are exposed to violence and discrimination etc., and that begging is not done everyday, one can also surmise that they do not treat the place where they beg as an 'everyday place.' Instead, the society that they consider their primary and ordinary one is grounded on more intimate human relations at their place of residence, based on the commonality and similarity of their individual experiences, languages and neighborly relations. In Chapter III, I cite the experience of a mother who has pinned her future hopes on her sons, devoting her enthusiasm to their education, and describe her experiences building relations with her neighbors, in spite of the uncertainty of their lives in the near future. The beggars selectively enter and leave these communal worlds as they see fit, sometimes as beggars and sometimes as 'ordinary' people, at their main place of begging as well as their current places of residence. By empirically discussing the above points, I show in this paper that the beggars of modern Tashkent, having invented the category of 'ordinary' people, play a certain role in the city by helping people accomplish religious good deeds. That includes the system of urban society that recognizes the legitimacy of earning money. Moreover, I also try to demonstrate the creation of the urban subcultures that comprise all of the beggars' activities.