外国が保護貿易政策を採るときの自国の貿易の利益 Gains from Trade when the Opponent takes a Protective Trade Policy

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著者

抄録

In the Nash game with fixed costs, the equilibrium may be obtained as the corner solution, where one of the players can not produce at all. Fujiwara (2005) showed this case and proposed a government scheme to use subsidies to revive the firm of her own country. We show that, in case that the firm of the Home lost production, and if the Foreign government subsidizes her own firm, then the Home's firm will revive and recover production, and welfare also will improve by this selfish activity of the Foreign.

収録刊行物

  • 經濟學論究

    經濟學論究 60(1), 15-40, 2006-09

    関西学院大学

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    110006483042
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN00070295
  • 本文言語コード
    JPN
  • 資料種別
    Departmental Bulletin Paper
  • 雑誌種別
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    02868032
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    8540764
  • NDL 雑誌分類
    ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z3-190
  • データ提供元
    NDL  NII-ELS  IR 
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