デイヴィドソンのアクラシア論  [in Japanese] Davidson on Akrasia  [in Japanese]

An akrates acts against his own judgment intentionally, i.e. according with his own judgment. How can this be possible? In his paper "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?", Davidson explained as follows. The all-things-considered judgment is distinct from the unconditional judgment. The unconditional judgment is identical with intention, while the all-things-considered judgment is based on three syllogisms: the syllogism of pleasure, the syllogism of reason, and the syllogism of will. An akrates acts intentionally since he acts on an unconditional judgment, whereas he acts akratically since he acts against an all-things-considered judgment. In this paper, I argued that Davidson's theory has four difficulties. (1) One's will cannot be expressed in the form of syllogism. (2) It is impossible for an akrates to make the syllogism of pleasure. (3) Davidson doesn't explain the fact that the akratic action, which is irrational, involves no inferential mistake. (4) We cannot explain akrasia correctly if we identify the unconditional judgment with intention.

An akrates acts against his own judgment intentionally, i.e. according with his own judgment. How can this be possible? In his paper "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?", Davidson explained as follows. The all-things-considered judgment is distinct from the unconditional judgment. The unconditional judgment is identical with intention, while the all-things-considered judgment is based on three syllogisms: the syllogism of pleasure, the syllogism of reason, and the syllogism of will. An akrates acts intentionally since he acts on an unconditional judgment, whereas he acts akratically since he acts against an all-things-considered judgment. In this paper, I argued that Davidson's theory has four difficulties. (1) One's will cannot be expressed in the form of syllogism. (2) It is impossible for an akrates to make the syllogism of pleasure. (3) Davidson doesn't explain the fact that the akratic action, which is irrational, involves no inferential mistake. (4) We cannot explain akrasia correctly if we identify the unconditional judgment with intention.