書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation(Special Issue Dedicated to Professor Nobumasa NAKATA)
- コーポレート ガバナンス ト ケイエイシャ ホウシュウ
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抄録
The compensation of top executives is a subject that has generated much debate in the United States since 1980s due to the large increases in executive compensation of leading companies. Agency theory has emerged as the principal theory guiding research on the pay-performance relationship. Agency theory predicts a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance. However, much agency-based empirical work done on the determinants of compensation in the last thirty years shows that there is only a very weak statistical link between executive compensation and corporate performance. An understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing an effective corporate governance system. This paper reviews some research on pay for performance of CEOs and suggests a more integrated approach, including non-economic factors. Section 2 describes the pay trends and forms of long-term incentives of top executives in the United States. Section 3 reviews some agency-based empirical research on top executives pay. Section 4 discusses that executive risk-bearing is contingent on the situations and that executives can entrench themselves by influencing the CEO-Board relationship. Section 5 is concluding remarks.
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KJ00005058192
論文
Article
収録刊行物
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- 桃山学院大学経済経営論集
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桃山学院大学経済経営論集 43 (4), 67-97, 2002-03-01
和泉 : 桃山学院大学総合研究所
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詳細情報
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- CRID
- 1050282812565972224
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- NII論文ID
- 110006966158
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00240555
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- ISSN
- 02869721
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- NDL書誌ID
- 6163041
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- 本文言語コード
- ja
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- 資料種別
- departmental bulletin paper
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- データソース種別
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- IRDB
- NDL
- CiNii Articles