抄録
はじめに 本稿の目的は、中東における体制持続メカニズムの解明にある。著者はこれまでレンティア国家論、体制類型論、体制変動の一般均衡モデルならびにモデルが与える含意の事例追跡を行い、この目的を果たそうとしてきた[浜中2006；2007；2009；Hamanaka2008］。一連の研究を通じて、権威主義体制の持続には所得格差と社会的コストが大きく影響していること、そして政府はこれらの変数を一定範囲に統制することで体制変動を避けられることが明らかになった。しかしながら以上の研究は、なぜ中東諸国の政府が議会内に野党の存在を許し、一定の範囲で立法過程への政治参加を認めるのか、という問題を解明していない。イスラーム主義を掲げる野党勢力が国会で議席を有し、政治的な発言権を獲得している事実は体制存続のリスク要因と考えられる。なぜなら議会での勢力拡大が一気呵成の民主化移行、すなわち独裁体制の崩壊へと繋がりかねないからだ。民主的に見える議会内での政党政治を非民主体制が抱えるというパラドックスはなぜ生じているのか。このパズルについて解答を試みたい。
This article explores regime survival mechanism in the Middle East Considering the inference from literature does not answer the puzzle: why do authoritarian regimes forgive the existence of oppositions and admit their political participation? Cooptation may be a key concept to solve the puzzle. The Gandhi-Przeworski model has a game theoretic constitution with the authoritarian government and the opposition. This is a kind of style leave it or takes it offer game. The government makes an offer at first, then the opposition decides to leave it or take it. The model gives us the three equilibria: cooperation, cooptation, and turmoil equilibrium. In the cooperation state, the opposition does not resist and accepts the offer from the government. The cooperation equilibrium is similar to the cooptation, but the government recognizes the strength of the opposition and makes a concession to it The author expects that cooperation is usual and cooptation equilibrium has occurred in the Middle Eastern countries in crisis. The model hypothesizes that authoritarian regimes resorted to cooptation to avert serious crises. The article chooses a couple of cases, Jordan and Egypt, to test the above hypothesis. The case study inquires about cooptation politics of the government for the Muslim Brotherhood, in a systematic consideration of regional as well as historical context. This Process Tracing is able to explore an intricate causal relationship among preferences of actors, in the time-series sequence of events, and the situation.
