市町村予算決定要因としての首長任期

• 川浦 昭彦

書誌事項

タイトル別名

• Mayor term as a determinant of municipality budget

抄録

This paper investigates behavior of multi-term elected officials. Based on the tenure-ability linkage, long-serving, multi-term incumbents are hypothesized to have incentives to increase public resources under their control. This hypothesis is tested with budget data of municipalities in Japan. Results of regression analysis are consistent with the hypotheses regarding incentives of multi-term incumbents. Incumbent's additional term increases the municipality's expenditure per capita by 1.64% - 1.74% over the municipalities' average. This finding constitutes a significant policy implication in favor of adoption of term limits, since public policies under long-serving incumbents are biased to the direction of excessive presence of government activities

収録刊行物

• 同志社政策科学研究

  同志社政策科学研究 14 (1), 33-37, 2012-09-15

  同志社大学政策学会

キーワード

• 318

詳細情報

• CRID: 1390290699890497536
• NII論文ID: 110009471250
• NII書誌ID: AA11408121
• DOI: 10.14988/pa.2017.0000012886
• NDL書誌ID: 024006606
• ISSN: 18808336
• Web Site: https://doshisha.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/21864
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I024006606
• 本文言語コード: en
• データソース種別:
  • JaLC
  • IRDB
  • NDL
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• 抄録ライセンスフラグ: 使用可