Fiscal Stimulus in an Endogenous Job Separation Model

• Ryuta Ray Kato

  International University of Japan

• Hiroaki Miyamoto

  International University of Japan

抄録

This paper re-visits effects of fiscal expansion on employment and unemployment by focusing on both hiring and firing margins. We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with labor search frictions in which job separation is endogenously determined. We study effects of fiscal stimuli in the form of government spending and hiring subsidies.The prediction of our model is in contrast with earlier studies that assume exogenous job separation. First, our model generates a larger size of the impact of a government spending shock on labor market variables than the model without endogenous separation. Second, while an increase in hiring subsidies increases employment and reduces unemployment in the model without endogenous separation, it reduces employment and increases unemploymentin our model.

収録刊行物

• Economics & management series

  Economics & management series 2013 1-28, 2013-02

  国際大学

キーワード

• Fiscal Policy
• Unemployment
• Labor market
• Search and matching

詳細情報

• CRID: 1571980077827230336
• NII論文ID: 110009551297
• NII書誌ID: AA12509645
• 本文言語コード: en
• データソース種別:
  • CiNii Articles