価格戦略コミットメントゲームの混合戦略均衡

• 村田, 省三

書誌事項

タイトル別名

• カカク センリャク コミットメントゲーム ノ コンゴウ センリャク キンコウ
• On the Equilibrium of Price Commitment Games with Mixed Strategy

抄録

In this paper, we consider the commitment game of Hamilton and Sultsky (1990), and point out that the simultaneous move Nash equilibria must be. This equilibria does not deleted by some dominant strategy. The experimental evidence obtained in Fonseca et al (2006) is not contradiction. Furthermore, we prove the non existence of mixed equilibria in the commitment game of Hamilton and Sultsky (1990) in the case of price setting duopoly basic games where the best reply curve of each player has positive slope. In the price setting duopoly game, deviating to the the player's best reply curve is always profitable.

經營と經濟, 92(4), pp.29-43; 2013

収録刊行物

• 經營と經濟

  經營と經濟 92 (4), 29-43, 2013-03-25

  長崎大学経済学会

キーワード

• action commitment game
• mixed equilibria
• isoprofit curve

詳細情報

• CRID: 1050005822298381312
• NII論文ID: 110009558695
• NII書誌ID: AN00069150
• ISSN: 02869101
• HANDLE: 10069/31438
• NDL書誌ID: 024519588
• Web Site: https://nagasaki-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/8655
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I024519588
• 本文言語コード: ja
• 資料種別: departmental bulletin paper
• データソース種別:
  • IRDB
  • NDL
  • CiNii Articles