機械体系による生産 : ナッシュ均衡

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  • Production by Means of the Machine System : Nash Equilibrium
  • キカイ タイケイ ニ ヨル セイサン : ナッシュ キンコウ

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In the period of industrial revolutions in advanced industrial countries, in the expansion of large-scale industry with machinery, factories were built one after another in every region in each country and the factory system was established. It is well known that under the factory system laborers were deprived of their control over the quality and quantity of their own labor and their dependence on production by means of the machine system grows rapidly. Why is production by means of the machine system so restrictive on the behavior of an individual laborer? To put it another way, in this type of production technology, why can't each laborer carry out his free decision? In this paper we examine the properties of the productive organization that is the cooperative relations among laborers which are formed on production by means of the machine system. Yet, before examining the feasibility of free decisionmaking by laborers, we must make clear what exactly it is in advance. So in this paper we explore, regardless of whether it is feasible or not, what the free decision-making by laborers is like in production by means of the machine system. First, each worker actually gets a portion of social product in exchange for his own labor and he will, making his free decision, take this fact into account very well. Suppose that productive organization manufacturing products by means of the machine system is self-sufficient, then, each worker can't choose his own desirable working hours and consumption goods without expecting the performances of other workers in his productive organization. In other words in production by means of the machine system, the free decision-makings by all the members of productive organization are interdependent and, in this sense, each worker is confronted with a game-theoretic situation. We have demonstrated that free decision-making by workers in production by means of the machine system forms a Nash equilibrium point in the productive organization adopting this production technology; the free decision-making by workers can be characterized as a Nash equilibrium point of the productive organization. Second, we have examined the economic welfare of Nash equilibria in a few productive organizations. When each worker holds exactly the same portion of total product as his own contribution to production in the simple cooperation of labor, a Nash equilibrium point in the productive organization is Pareto optimal. On the other hand, a Nash equilibrium point in the productive organization in production by means of the machine system is, in so far as labor input of each worker is positive, not Pareto optimal. In his free decision-making, each worker is constrained by nothing but technical conditions of production; surely no contract will be made to restrict his behavior. Without making contract to enforce certain cooperative conducts between all the workers engaged in production by means of the machine system, no one can expect a further improvement of his utility at a Nash equilibrium point of the productive organization. With certain agreement, however, with enforcement between them, each of them can expect a rise in his utility level. This suggests that, in terms of economic welfare, cooperation between workers instead of their independent decision-makings, more exactly an ex-ante coordination of productive activities between workers, therefore an advance production planning is desirable in production by means of the machine system.

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