Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups

DOI HANDLE Web Site Web Site 参考文献36件 オープンアクセス

この論文をさがす

抄録

This paper offers an empirical test of complementarities among delegated authority, accountability, and monitoring, using unique survey data collected from group　affiliated companies in Japan. The survey provides information about how various decisions are made within business groups, each of which consists of a large core parent firm and its network of affiliated firms such as subsidiaries and related companies. We find some evidence that delegated authority and accountability are complementary, implying that increasing assigned accountability raises the marginal return from increasing delegated authority. We also obtain a stronger result that performance is likely to be better under the combination of low authority and low accountability or that of high authority and high accountability than under the “mix and match” combinations where one is low and the other high. We then study the effects of monitoring intensity on the authority-accountability pair and find that performance of the firm with the combination of high authority and high accountability is increasing in monitoring intensity, while the combination of low authority and low accountability is not. This result is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that increasing monitoring intensity raises the marginal return from increasing delegated authority and accountability.

収録刊行物

参考文献 (36)*注記

もっと見る

関連プロジェクト

もっと見る

キーワード

詳細情報 詳細情報について

問題の指摘

ページトップへ