サダト政権の国内「自由化」政策 -一九七四～一九七八年-

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タイトル別名
  • “Liberalization” Policy under the Sadat Regime: 1974-1978
  • サダト政権の国内「自由化」政策--1974～1978年
  • サダト セイケン ノ コクナイ ジユウカ セイサク 1974 1978ネン
  • The Middle East : The Political Changes of the 1970s
  • 中東:1970年代の政治変動

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The purpose of this paper is to examine various aspects of the “liberalization” policy undertaken on the initiative of Sadat in 1974, concentrating particularly on the country's economic and socio-political conditions.<br>First, the “open-door” policy aimed to achieve economic development mainly by depending on external financing—economic aid and private investment extracted from the Western major powers and oil-producing Arab countries. For instance, U. S. president Nixon promised large-scale economic aid to the tune of two billion dollars when he visited Egypt in June, 1974. As a matter of fact, both domestic private capital and foreign capital did not flow into the manufacturing sector, which was a sector with a high investment risk, but was rather concentrated in the commercial sector, real estate in urban areas and agricultural land for commercial crops. Also the gap between the rich and poor widened. While a few nouveaux riches appeared, being parasites on foreign capital, the living standard of the middle and lower classes —at least 90 percent of Egypt's population— did not show a significant sign of improvement. The food riots which erupted in January, March, 1975 and January, 1977 reflected such discontent of the poor.<br>Second, in the socio-political realm, Sadat incorporated a controlled multi-party system in November, 1976 although its institutionalization was incomplete from the point of view of parliamentary democracy. It is very doubtful whether Sadat intended to allow plural political parties to compete for power. Probably, as David Hirst and Irene Beeson indicate, he intended to make the National Assembly play a new role—the role of “lightning conductor” to prevent the anticipated eruption of the discontent of the poor. But on the positive side, the minority parties such as the Liberal Socialist Party were given the opportunity to express their criticism of the regime through debates in the National Assembly and the publication of their party organ. Also, importantly, under the Sadat regime, the police-state and reign-of-terror factor which had been characteristic of the Nasser regime lessened, so that a feeling ofrelease and a sense of freedom could be seen in civil life. On the other side of the coin, however, anti-regime movements, such as the Islamic fundamentalists' movement which led to the assassination of Sadat in October, 1981, gathered momentum, especially with the mounting economic discontent of the poor as a catalyst.<br>The problems that the Egyptian economy are facing are very serious and common to the developing countries in general. To promote political liberalization under such conditions does not so much mean to increase the structural legitimacy of the regime as to amplify the anti-regime movements. This points to the slow-down of political democratization in the foreseeable future. Indeed as John Waterbury indicates, “Egypt is the prisoner of its economy.” And Egypt's case of the interwining of politico-economic problems can be generally seen throughout the Arab states, regardless of the state form; kingdom, republic, military or socialist regime.

収録刊行物

  • 国際政治

    国際政治 1983 (73), 119-134,L15, 1983-05-25

    一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

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