抄録
<jats:p>We compare a <jats:italic>partners condition</jats:italic>, where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game, to a <jats:italic>strangers condition</jats:italic>, where subjects play this game in changing group formations. From the first period onward, subjects in the partners condition contribute significantly more to the public good than subjects in the strangers condition. Strangers' contributions show continual decay, while partners' contributions fluctuate on a high level prior to decreasing in the final periods. We interpret subjects' behaviour in terms of <jats:italic>conditional cooperation</jats:italic> which is characterized by both future‐oriented and reactive behaviour.</jats:p><jats:p>JEL classifications: <jats:italic>C</jats:italic>91; <jats:italic>C</jats:italic>92; <jats:italic>H</jats:italic>41</jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
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The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102 (1), 23-39, 2000-03
Wiley
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1360855568862085120
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- NII論文ID
- 30005192408
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- ISSN
- 14679442
- 03470520
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- データソース種別
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- Crossref
- CiNii Articles