Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence : theory and evidence

著者

• Cukierman, Alex

書誌事項

Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence : theory and evidence

Alex Cukierman

MIT Press, c1992

注記

Bibliography: p. [473]-483

Includes index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Alex Cukierman is known for his work on central bank behaviour. This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with developments in the political economy of monetary policy. Filled with applications, it provides an analysis of central bank decisions, of the various effects of policy on inflation, and of the feedback from inflationary expectations to policy choices. Cukierman uncovers and analyzes the reasons for positive inflation and rates of monetary expansion. He shows that the money supply, and therefore inflation, are not exogenous. They are influenced by interactions involving distributional considerations, private information, personal motives, and the political environment. This point of view makes it possible to idenfity the institutional, political, and other features of a country that may be conducive to inflationary environments. Cukierman presents multidimensional evidence on both legal and actual central bank independence for a sample of up to 70 countries and uses it to investigate the interconnections between the distributions of inflation and of central bank independence. He takes up such issues as why some countries have more independent central banks than others and identifies reasons for the substantial cross country variation in seigniorage. He provides positive explanations for the tendency of central banks, like the US Federal Reserve, to smooth interest rates and to be secretive. Observing that it is likely that the European Economic Community will have a monetary union before the turn of the century, Cukierman applies the techniques of modern political economy to discuss the effect of this change on the commitment to price stability. The book includes simple and advanced materials as well as informal summaries of the major technical results. The introduction contains a modular guide for reading and teaching the material.

目次

• Part 1 Motives for monetary expansion under perfect information: overview
• the employment motive for monetary expansion
• the revenue motive for monetary expansion
• the mercantile or balance-of-payments motive for monetary expansion
• comparison of policy outcomes under a system of adjustable pegs with outcomes under a commonly managed currency system and its consequences for European monetary unification
• the financial stability motive, interest rate smoothing, and the theory of optimal seigniorage. Part 2 Asymmetric information and changing objectives under discretion: overview of models of monetary policy with private information
• the employment motive in the presence of a minimal information advantage about objectives
• an extended information advantage about central bank objectives
• alternative notions of credibility and reputation
• the politically optimal level of ambiguity. Part 3 Velocity shocks, politics, signalling, inflation persistence, and accommodation: private information about money demand and credibility
• partial disclosure of policy and its effect on policy outcomes
• why does inflation persist? - theories of monetary accommodation and of inflation cyclicality under discretion
• signalling and private information about the ability to commit and about objectives with time-invariant types
• political parties and monetary policy. Part 4 Central bank independence and policy outcomes - theory and evidence: aspects of central bank independence and their impact on policy outcomes and the distribution of inflation
• the measurement of central bank independence
• inflation and central bank independence
• ranking of central banks by an overall index of inflation-based central bank independence
• the mean and the variance of inflation, central bank credit, and central bank independence
• the determinants of central bank independence.

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA19113152
• ISBN:
  • 0262031981
• LCCN: 92016775
• 出版国コード: us
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Cambridge, Mass.
• ページ数/冊数: xix, 496 p.
• 大きさ: 24 cm
• 分類:
  • NDC9 : 337.9
  • LCC : HG229
  • DC20 : 332.1/1
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models
  • LCSH : Monetary policy -- Econometric models
  • LCSH : Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models