Political cycles and the macroeconomy
著者
書誌事項
Political cycles and the macroeconomy
MIT Press, c1997
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
ISBN 9780262011617
内容説明
This work examines how electoral laws, the timing of elections, the ideological orientation of governments, and the nature of competition between political parties influence unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and monetary and fiscal policy. The book presents both a thorough overview of the theoretical literature and a considerable amount of empirical evidence. A common belief is that voters reward incumbents who artificially create favourable conditions before an election, even though the economy may take a turn for the worse immediately thereafter. The authors argue that the dynamics of political cycles are far more complex. In their review of the main theoretical approaches to the issues, they demonstrate the multifaceted relationships between macroeconomic and political policies. They also present a broad range of empirical data, from the United States as well as OECD countries. One of their most striking findings is that the United States is not exceptional; the relationships between political and economic cycles are remarkably similar in other democracies, particularly those with two-party systems.
目次
- Part 1 Overview: organization of the book
- how does this book relate to previous research?
- technical level of this book. Part 2 Opportunistic models: introduction
- the traditional opportunistic model - the political business cycle
- rational opportunistic models
- rational retrospective voting
- conclusions
- appendix. Part 3 Partisan models: introduction
- the traditional partisan model
- the rational partisan model
- welfare properties of partisan cycles
- a rational partisan model with retrospective voting
- discussion and conclusions
- appendix. Part 4 Political cycles in the United States: introduction
- previous empirical results
- data and basic statistics
- specification of the empirical tests
- evidence on the partisan theories
- evidence on political business cycles
- political cycles in monetary policy
- political cycles in fiscal policy
- discussion - alternative hypotheses
- conclusions
- appendix. Part 5 Polls, electoral uncertainty and the economy: introduction
- the electoral option and its application to models of partisan politics
- political information and financial markets - an overview
- conclusion
- appendices. Part 6 Political cycles in industrial economies: introduction
- previous empirical results
- data and specification of empirical tests
- evidence on the rational partisan theory
- traditional partisan theory
- level versus growth effects
- evidence on political business cycles
- endogenous elections and opportunistic policymakers
- conclusions
- appendix. Part 7 Political cycles and macroeconomic policies - evidence from industrial democracies: introduction
- data and specification of empirical tests for monetary policy
- evidence on partisan effects in monetary policy
- evidence on political business cycle effects in monetary policy
- electoral and partisan determinants of fiscal policy and budget deficits
- conclusions
- appendix. Part 8 Political cycles and central bank independence: introduction
- independent central banks
- political cycles and central bank independence
- a note on the "contracting" approach
- conclusions
- appendix. Part 9 Political parties, institutions and budget deficits: introduction
- political models of budget deficits
- opportunistic and partisan effects on fiscal policy revisited
- normative implications
- conclusions
- appendix. Part 10 Conclusions: summary of results
- are political cycles going to disappear?.
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780262510943
内容説明
The relationship between political and economic cycles is one of the most widely studied topics in political economics. This book examines how electoral laws, the timing of elections, the ideological orientation of governments, and the nature of competition between political parties influence unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and monetary and fiscal policy. The book presents both a thorough overview of the theoretical literature and a vast amount of empirical evidence. A common belief is that voters reward incumbents who artificially create favorable conditions before an election, even though the economy may take a turn for the worse immediately thereafter. The authors argue that the dynamics of political cycles are far more complex. In their review of the main theoretical approaches to the issues, they demonstrate the multifaceted relationships between macroeconomic and political policies. They also present a broad range of empirical data, from the United States as well as OECD countries. One of their most striking findings is that the United States is not exceptional; the relationships between political and economic cycles are remarkably similar in other democracies, particularly those with two-party systems.
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