Modeling bounded rationality

著者

• Rubinstein, Ariel

書誌事項

Modeling bounded rationality

Ariel Rubinstein

（Zeuthen lecture book series / Karl Gunnar Persson, editor）

MIT Press, c1998

• : hard
• : pbk

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [195]-201) and index

内容説明・目次

巻冊次

: hard ISBN 9780262181877

内容説明

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950's by Herbert Simon. In this book the author defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modelling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book the author considers the modelling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modelling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know and group decisions. In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modelling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modelling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response.

目次

• Part 1 Introduction: "modelling" and "bounded rationality"
• the aim of this book
• the state of the art
• a personal note
• bibliographic notes. Part 2 Bounded rationality in choice: the "rational man"
• the traditional economist's position
• the attack on the traditional approach
• experimental evidence
• comments
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 3 Modelling procedural decision making: motivation
• preparing the tools - similarity relations
• a procedure of choice between vectors
• analysis
• case-based theory
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 4 Modelling knowledge: knowledge and bounded rationality
• information structure
• the set-theoretical definition of knowledge
• Kripke's model
• the impact of the timing of decisions and having more information
• on the possibility of speculative trade
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 5 Modelling limited memory: imperfect recall
• an extensive decision making model with imperfect information
• perfect and imperfect recall
• time consistency
• the role of randomization
• the multiselves approach
• on the problematics of using the model
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 6 Choosing what to know: optimal information structures
• what is "high" and what is "low"?
• manipulating informational restrictions
• perceptrons
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 7 Modelling complexity in group decisions: introduction
• the model of a team
• processing information
• aggregating preferences
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 8 Modelling bounded rationality in games: introduction
• interaction between Luce players
• a game with procedural rational players
• limited foresight in extensive games
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 9 Complexity considerations in repeated games: introduction
• the model of repeated games - a brief review
• strategies as machines in infinitely repeated games
• complexity considerations in repeated games
• the structure of machine games equilibria
• repeated extensive games
• concluding remarks
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 10 Attempting to resolve the finite horizon paradoxes: motivation
• implementation of strategies by machines
• counting is costly
• bounded capability to count
• machines also send messages
• the e-equilibrium approach - a deviation is costly
• conclusion
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 11 Computability constraints in games: introduction
• informal results on computability
• is there a rational player?
• Turing machine game
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 12 Final thoughts: Simon's critique
• response.

巻冊次

: pbk ISBN 9780262681001

内容説明

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions.In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response. The Zeuthen Lecture Book series is sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.

目次

• Part 1 Introduction: "modelling" and "bounded rationality"
• the aim of this book
• the state of the art
• a personal note
• bibliographic notes. Part 2 Bounded rationality in choice: the "rational man"
• the traditional economist's position
• the attack on the traditional approach
• experimental evidence
• comments
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 3 Modelling procedural decision making: motivation
• preparing the tools - similarity relations
• a procedure of choice between vectors
• analysis
• case-based theory
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 4 Modelling knowledge: knowledge and bounded rationality
• information structure
• the set-theoretical definition of knowledge
• Kripke's model
• the impact of the timing of decisions and having more information
• on the possibility of speculative trade
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 5 Modelling limited memory: imperfect recall
• an extensive decision making model with imperfect information
• perfect and imperfect recall
• time consistency
• the role of randomization
• the multiselves approach
• on the problematics of using the model
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 6 Choosing what to know: optimal information structures
• what is "high" and what is "low"?
• manipulating informational restrictions
• perceptrons
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 7 Modelling complexity in group decisions: introduction
• the model of a team
• processing information
• aggregating preferences
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 8 Modelling bounded rationality in games: introduction
• interaction between Luce players
• a game with procedural rational players
• limited foresight in extensive games
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 9 Complexity considerations in repeated games: introduction
• the model of repeated games - a brief review
• strategies as machines in infinitely repeated games
• complexity considerations in repeated games
• the structure of machine games equilibria
• repeated extensive games
• concluding remarks
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 10 Attempting to resolve the finite horizon paradoxes: motivation
• implementation of strategies by machines
• counting is costly
• bounded capability to count
• machines also send messages
• the e-equilibrium approach - a deviation is costly
• conclusion
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 11 Computability constraints in games: introduction
• informal results on computability
• is there a rational player?
• Turing machine game
• bibliographic notes
• projects. Part 12 Final thoughts: Simon's critique
• response.

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA3541261X
• ISBN:
  • 0262181878
  • 9780262681001
• LCCN: 97040481
• 出版国コード: us
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Cambridge, Mass.
• ページ数/冊数: viii, 208 p.
• 大きさ: 23 cm
• 分類:
  • NDC9 : 331.1
  • LCC : HD30.23
  • DC21 : 153.8/3
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Decision-making
  • LCSH : Economic man
  • LCSH : Game theory
  • LCSH : Rational expectations (Economic theory)
• 親書誌ID:
  • BA35412857