書誌事項

Games and decision making

Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Subir K. Chakrabarti

Oxford University Press, 2000

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 57

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注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. 251-252) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

This is a self-contained introduction to basic issues and techniques of decision theory. From classical optimization to modern game theory, the authors show the increasing importance of mathematical knowledge for sustained competitive advantage in decision making. Students need only a basic understanding of elementary calculus and probability to use the book effectively. Through an imaginative selection of topics, the authors treat decision and game theory as part of one body of knowledge. They move from problems involving the individual decision maker to progressively more complex problems such as sequential rationality, auctions, and bargaining. By building each chapter on material presented earlier, the authors ensure that the text is clear and accessible to all.

目次

  • 1. Choices
  • 1.1 Functions
  • 1.2 The optimization problem
  • 1.3 First order conditions
  • 1.4 Optimizing uisng the Lagrange method
  • 1.5 Uncertainty and chance
  • 1.6 Decision making under uncertainty
  • 2. Decision and Games
  • 2.1 Two-person matrix games
  • 2.2 Strategic form games
  • 2.3 Applications
  • 2.4 Solving matrix games with mixed strategies
  • 3. Sequential Decisions
  • 3.1 Graphs and trees
  • 3.2 Single-person decisions
  • 3.3 Uncertainty and single-person decisions
  • 4. Sequential Games
  • 4.1 The structure of sequential games
  • 4.2 Sequential games with perfect information
  • 4.3 Sequential games with imperfect information
  • 5. Sequential Rationality
  • 5.1 The market for lemons
  • 5.2 Beliefs and strategies
  • 5.3 Consistency of beliefs
  • 5.4 Expected payoff
  • 5.5 Sequential equilibrium
  • 5.6 Applications: signaling games
  • 6. Auctions
  • 6.1 Auctions with complete information
  • 6.2 Individual private value auctions
  • 6.3 English auctions
  • 6.4 Common-value auctions
  • 7. Bargaining
  • 7.1 The Nash solution
  • 7.2 Monotonicity in bargaining
  • 7.3 The core of a bargaining game
  • 7.4 Allocation Rules: The Shapley Value
  • 7.5 Two-Person Sequential Bargaining
  • BIBLIOGRAPHY
  • INDEX

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    BA42704819
  • ISBN
    • 0195126092
  • LCCN
    98045396
  • 出版国コード
    us
  • タイトル言語コード
    eng
  • 本文言語コード
    eng
  • 出版地
    New York ; Oxford
  • ページ数/冊数
    xi, 257 p.
  • 大きさ
    25 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名
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