Assertion and conditionals
著者
書誌事項
Assertion and conditionals
（Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa）
Cambridge University Press, 2008
- : paperback
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注記
First published: 1985
This digitally printed version 2008
Includes bibliographical references (p. 254-261 ) and indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses.
目次
- 1. Cartesianism, behaviourism and the philosophical context
- Part I. Belief: 2. A theory of the mind
- 3. Belief and decision
- 4. Computation
- 5. Truth conditions
- Part II. Meaning: 6. Realism and truth-theory
- 7. Assertion
- Part III. Conditionals: 8. Indicative conditionals
- 9. Truth and triviality
- 10. Logic without truth
- 11. Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals.
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