Bibliographic Information

Ethical relativity

Edward Westermarck

(International library of philosophy, . Ethics and political philosophy ; 6)

Routledge, 2010

  • : pbk

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Note

First published: London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1932

Includes index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This is Volume of VI Of six in a series on Ethic and Political Philosophy. Originally published in 1932, this study looks at how the emotional origin of moral judgments consistently leads to a denial of the objective validity ascribed to them both by common sense and by normative theories of ethics.

Table of Contents

I. THE SUPPOSED OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS II. THE SUPPOSED OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS (CONCLUDED) III. THE MORAL EMOTIONS IV. THE MORAL EMOTIONs (CONCLUDED) V. THE MORAL CONCEPTS VI. THE SUBJECTs OF MORAL JUDGMENTS VII. THE VARIABILITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS VIII. THE EMOTIONAL BACKGROUND OF NORMATIVE THEORIES IX. THE EMOTIONAL BACKGROUND OF NORMATIVE THEORIES (CONCLUDED)

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Details

  • NCID
    BB08383345
  • ISBN
    • 9780415613712
  • Country Code
    uk
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Abingdon
  • Pages/Volumes
    xviii, 301 p.
  • Size
    22 cm
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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