Money and the rule of law : generality and predictability in monetary institutions

著者

書誌事項

Money and the rule of law : generality and predictability in monetary institutions

Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, Daniel J. Smith

Cambridge University Press, 2021

  • : pbk

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注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

Summary: "The reigning paradigm in monetary theory and policy has settled on 'constrained discretion' as the preferred central bank operating framework. This supposedly combines the best features of rules and discretion in central banking. But this romantic view is wrong. Constrained discretion is just discretion. No matter how smart or well-intentioned, discretionary central banking is plagued with information and incentive problems. These problems make it systematically unlikely that central bankers can deliver macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, discretionary central banking implicitly violates many of the jurisprudential norms of liberal democracy. Especially since the 2007-8 financial crisis, discretionary central banking has demonstrated it is difficult to reconcile with self-governance. We develop several novel arguments for why rules are preferable to discretion in monetary policy. Drawing on a wide body of scholarship, and especially the work of Nobel laureates Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek..."

収録内容

  • Knowledge problems with discretionary monetary policy
  • Incentive prolems with discretionary central banking
  • When firefighters are arsonists
  • On the shoulders of giants: monetary policy insights of the classically liberal nobel laureates
  • Money and the rule of law
  • Conclusion: money and liberalism in the 21st century

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Contemporary monetary institutions are flawed at a foundational level. The reigning paradigm in monetary policy holds up constrained discretion as the preferred operating framework for central banks. But no matter how smart or well-intentioned are central bankers, discretionary policy contains information and incentive problems that make macroeconomic stability systematically unlikely. Furthermore, central bank discretion implicitly violates the basic jurisprudential norms of liberal democracy. Drawing on a wide body of scholarship, this volume presents a novel argument in favor of embedding monetary institutions into a rule of law framework. The authors argue for general, predictable rules to provide a sturdier foundation for economic growth and prosperity. A rule of law approach to monetary policy would remedy the flaws that resulted in misguided monetary responses to the 2007-8 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding the case for true monetary rules is the first step toward creating more stable monetary institutions.

目次

  • Preface
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Knowledge problems with discretionary monetary policy
  • 3. Incentive problems with discretionary central banking
  • 4. When firefighters are arsonists
  • 5. On the shoulders of giants: monetary policy insights of the classically liberl Nobel Laurates
  • 6. Money and the rule of law
  • 7. Conclusion: money and liberalism in the 21st century.

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