Time, identity and the self : essays on metaphysics

This volume contains twenty-four essays by the British/Australian analytic metaphysician, Brian Garrett. These essays are followed by four short dialogues that emphasize and summarize some of the main points of the essays and discuss new perspectives that have emerged since their original publication. The volume covers topics on the metaphysics of time, the nature of identity, and the nature and importance of persons and human beings. The chapters constitute the fruits of almost four decades of philosophical research, from Brian's two award-winning essays, published in Analysis in 1983 and The Philosophical Quarterly in 1992, to his latest ideas about Fatalism and the Grandfather Paradox. This book will be of interest to students and professional philosophers in the field of analytic philosophy.

ForewordPrefaceAcknowledgement Part I. Time1. "Thank Goodness that's Over" Revisited1.1 Prior's Puzzle and the Two Views about the Nature of Time1.2 Responses to Prior's Puzzle1.3 A Riposte1.4 Concluding RemarksReferences 2. Experience and Time2.1 Justifying our Bias towards the Present2.2 Value and the Metaphysics of Time2.3 Concluding RemarksReferences 3. Max Black and Backward Causation3.1 Black's Main Claim3.2 Black's Two Arguments3.3 Analysing Black's ArgumentsReferences 4. Dummett on Reasons to Act and Bringing about the Past4.1 Introduction4.2 Dissecting Dummett's Argument4.3 The Second Sceptical Argument4.4 The Third Sceptical Argument4.5 ConclusionReferences 5. Dummett on McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time5.1 Introduction5.2 McTaggart's Argument5.3 Temporal versus Spatial Immersion5.4 Observer-independenceReferences 6. A Note on the Grandfather Paradox6.1 Lewis's Theory6.2 Against Lewis's Theory6.3 ConclusionReferences 7. Bulletproof Grandfathers, David Lewis, and 'Can't'-Judgements7.1 A General Argument7.2 Misapplied Contextualism7.3 A Time Symmetry Argument7.4 Alternative Arguments7.5 Concluding RemarksReferences 8. A Dilemma for Eternalists8.1 Introduction8.2 The Dilemma8.3 Some Options8.4 An UpshotReferences Part II. Identity9. Identity and Extrinsicness9.1 Introduction9.2 Setting Up the Problem9.3 Mackie on Best-Candidate Theories of Identity9.4 Assessing Mackie9.5 ConclusionReferences 10. Best Candidate Theories and Identity10.1 Introduction10.2 Best-Candidate Theories of Identity10.3 Brennan's Interpretation10.4 Assessing Brennan's Response10.5 Final WordsReferences 11 PossibleWorlds and Identity11.1 Introduction11.2 Forbes's Cases11.3 On Forbes's Grounded Transworld Identities11.4 ConclusionReferences 12. Vague Identity and Vague Objects12.1 Getting Clear about the Vague Identity Thesis12.2 Considering The Ship of Theseus12.3 Evans's Proof12.4 Responses to Evans's Proof12.5 The Correct Response to Evans's Proof12.6 A General Result12.7 ConclusionReferences 13. More on Rigidity and Scope13.1 More's Thesis13.2 More's Arguments13.3 Why More's Arguments Fail13.4 ConclusionReferences 14. Enduring Endurantism14.1 Barker and Dowe's First Argument14.2 Barker and Dowe's Second Argument14.3 Barker and Dowe's Third Argument14.4 ConclusionReferences 15. Identity of Truth-Conditions15.1 Analysis Problem no. 1915.2 The SolutionReferences Part III. The Self16. Some Notes on Animalism16.1 Animalism16.2 Why Animalism is True16.3 Why Animalism can't be True16.4 A Familiar Analogy16.5 ConclusionReferences 17. Persons and Human Beings17.1 The Lockean Conception of Person17.2 The Animal Attribute Conception of Persons17.3 Evaluating the Two Conceptions of Persons17.4 ConclusionReferences 18. The Story of 'I': Comments on Rudder-Baker's Constitution View of Persons18.1 Introduction18.2 Rudder-Baker on Self-Consciousness and the First-Person18.3 Rudder-Baker on the First-Person Perspective18.4 A General Worry about Rudder-Baker's View18.5 Rudder-Baker on Personal Identity18.6 Rudder-Baker on the Determinancy of Personal Identity18.7 Rudder-Baker on Human PersonsReferences 19. Personal Identity and Extrinsicness19.1 Introduction19.2 Wiggins on the Case of Division19.3 The Challenge of Division19.4 Best-Candidate Theories and the "Only a and b" Condition19.5 Extrinsicness of Personal Identity19.6 Concluding RemarksReferences 20. Personal Identity and Reductionism20.1 Introduction20.2 What Ontological Reduction Is20.3 Ontological Reduction of Persons20.4 Reductionism and What MattersReferences 21. Bermudez on Self-Consciousness21.1 Introduction21.2 Self-consciousness, 'I'-thoughts, and the Deflationary Theory21.3 Critique21.4 Conclusion and Further WorkReferences 22. Anscombe on 'I'22.1 Introduction22.2 Anscombe's Challenge22.3 The Tank Argument22.4 Supporting the Referential ViewReferences 23. Wittgenstein on the First-Person23.1 The Problem with 'I'-Judgements23.2 Wittgenstein on the Two Uses of 'I'23.3 Analysing Wittgenstein's View23.4 The 'I'-as-subject and Self-ConsciousnessReferences 24. Persons and Values24.1 Theories of Values and the Definition of 'Person'24.2 The Case of Derek Parfit24.3 Two Theses about Personal Identity and What Matters24.4 The Argument from Analysis24.5 The Argument from Division24.6 The Argument from Reductionism24.7 ConclusionReferences Part IV. Afterthoughts25. About TimeReferences 26. Affecting the PastReferences 27. Of IdentityReferences 28. On Personal IdentityReferences Index