The Formation of Balinese Ideology in Western Lombok

Andrew Duff-Cooper*

"When the ten thousand things have been seen in their unity, we go back to the beginning...".

Ts'en Shen

I Introduction

The present study takes up the contention that "there remains much to be done in the study of analogical [or symbolic] classification... in a retrospective attempt to work out the cognitive and imaginative operations by which such classifications were constructed" (Needham 1980: 61) in relation to the Balinese form of life in western Lombok, Indonesia.¹

As I have pointed out elsewhere (Duff-Cooper 1987b), Needham's contention assumes, among other matters, that "enough is known about particular forms of life which evince this mode of classification for the analyst to be sure of what he or she is investigating the construction of". As far as the Balinese are concerned, their form of life has been subjected to fairly intense and prolonged analysis, the results of which have been brought together in two recent studies (Duff-Cooper 1986a; 1987d). Enough is known, therefore,

* Visiting Lecturer and a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Fellow, Keio University, Tokyo.

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about this form of life for it to be timely now (March 1987) to go back to the beginning, so to say, to try to work out how Balinese ideology has come to be what, from one perspective at least, it is.

Before we get down to that task, we should briefly consider why, when Needham writes of “analogical classification”, I refer to Balinese “ideology”. Analogical classification “comes into its own in symbolic concepts, ritual and cosmological speculation” (Needham 1980: 9); in practical affairs, by contrast, such as the articulation of lineage systems, classification by logical division, along the lines of a Tree of Porphyry, i.e., hierarchically, is employed.

This distinction between the ritual, etc., and the practical is one that has been analytically most profitable in Needham’s work, and especially for his long and important series of studies about prescriptive alliance; and it is, of course, one fruitful response to the concordance that Durkheim and Mauss suggested in their seminal essay on “De quelques Formes primitives de classification” (1903; 1963) subsists between the social and the symbolic orders of archaic forms of life.

This distinction of the symbolic and the practical, however, is not appropriately employed here: First, indigenously defined aspects of the Balinese form of life often have both symbolic and practical aspects. In rice-growing, for instance, the rite nuasen (Duff-Cooper 1987b), when the rice that is used to make an effigy of the rice goddess Sri (the nini) is planted, manifestly has complex symbolic aspects. But it is also a crucial part of the rice-growing process, and like other rites, both those connected with agriculture and those connected with other aspects of Balinese life such as house-building, having children, cooking, and introducing a new piece of machinery into service, contributes (in that case) to farmers’ work being rewarded with a successful crop. Non-performance of this as of other rites is correlated in Balinese ideology with misfortune of one kind or another. By separating out the symbolic from the practical,
which the Balinese do not do and which is hardly feasible—both rites and for instance agri- and horticulture, like house-building, constitute “work” (pakaryan/pagaénan)—we are unlikely to make much progress in understanding this form of life (cf., e.g., Hocart 1970a: 23).

Further, I have already argued that all aspects of Balinese life, if any, constitute ritual and are sacred (forthcoming-a). Another way of putting this social fact is to say, a little vaguely, that for the Balinese their daily lives are their religion. Thus, for instance, Chinese people from the large commercial centre called Cakranegara (some 3 km from Pagutan) who adopt some of the Balinese practices which concern the gods and other mystical (niskala) beings, but whose daily lives remain “Chinese”—they do not adopt other Balinese practices concerned with what is in time and usually material and visible (sakala)—are, I think, simply considered odd but to be indulged (there is money to be made from doing so) by such people as Pedanda Gdé who has dealings with them, as Geertz, implicitly with converse examples, suggests (1964: 293). Also, as Dibia (1985), for instance, points out, such occasions as temple festivals [odalan: when the gods come out or emerge (edal)] have not only religious but social and theatrical aspects too—and these, like the symbolic and practical aspects of rites, cannot readily be distinguished one from another.

Finally, although Balinese ideology equates the macrocosm (bhuvana agung) and the microcosm (bhuvana alit) which together constitute a unity (cf., e.g., Hooykaas 1974: 3, 7), those realms are neither mutually exclusive [as indeed the realms that are niskala and sakala are not (e.g., Duff-Cooper 1985c: 18)], nor do they correspond with the distinction between the symbolic and the practical, nor with that between the symbolic and the social. However, Ida Sang Hyang Vidhi, Balinese metaphysics teaches, is the high god of the Balinese. Vidhi is pervasive in the world in various guises. This social fact

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is the main reason why it is possible to show that a concordance that is akin to that which subsists in a structural sense between the social and the symbolic realms of, especially, social systems that evince prescriptive alliance (see n. 4), does indeed obtain in Balinese ideology.

This concordance, which is complex and which is explicated in sections III and IV below, however, does not obtain between the social and the symbolic orders in Balinese ideology for these realms do not there exist. It simply obtains between what on the face of it are disparate, indigenously defined aspects of this form of life, by virtue of the contexts that constitute them all being framed by all or some of a limited set of principles of order.

The above, therefore, are grounds enough for considering this ideology as a whole. Moreover, Balinese metaphysics teaches that this is so: Balinese forms of life (dharma) are contained in Vidhi as Sang Bindu, the point or the dot from which everything in the Balinese universe derives. It behoves us to take this social fact, which is central to Balinese ideology, seriously into account as we now take up the questions posed by our title.

II Witherspoon's Hypothesis: General

In his masterly monograph about language and art among the Navajo (Witherspoon 1977), Gary Witherspoon suggests a hypothesis as to from what all cultures are constructed and upon which they are all based. The limpid clarity and the detail of Witherspoon's work is arresting and admirable, and gives one confidence to think that here is a scholar who really knows what he is talking about. On these grounds alone Witherspoon's hypothesis commands attention. They are reinforced, though, by the formal terms in which he frames his hypothesis, for they render it a most apposite place to begin the present investigation (see post). Thus Witherspoon writes (1977: 5):
"It is my hypothesis (because there is little data available on this matter) that all cultures are constructed from and based on a single metaphysical principle which is axiomatic, unexplainable, and unprovable.... From this single premise a conceptual scheme develops by the positing of an opposition to it, from which it is then expanded into a more complex structure utilizing analogy, opposition, and synthesis as its tools of construction”.

Witherspoon is careful also to declare that he does not assume that this metaphysical principle is “the same for all cultures”, but he does think that “it may be the same” for many cultures which appear on the surface to be quite different from each other.

Witherspoon does not stipulate, however, by what criteria the sameness of two or more principles that are judged to be basic to an ideology is to be gauged, which makes this essentially comparative proposition difficult to assess: “Of any two things whatever, there is some respect in which they can be said to resemble each other and not to resemble some thing” (Hampshire 1959: 31). Yet this slight drawback to an aspect of Witherspoon’s hypothesis, which can be understood as a kind of aside to its main thesis, does not much detract from the profit to be had from considering the main hypothesis, as it were, in relation to Balinese ideology.

As a matter of good method, however, a number of general comments should be made about it before we go on to consider it in detail against the Balinese data. The first such comment is, that the tone of the hypothesis is intellectualist. By this word, I do not refer to “opposition” and “analogy” being cognitive concepts (cf., e.g., Needham 1983: 121-122). I mean rather to point to the active processes of thought which are implied by “synthesis” and by Witherspoon’s formulation of the development of an ideological scheme from the premise upon which it is based as being “by the positing” of an opposition to it. “Synthesis”, that is, according to
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the Oxford dictionary, means "the action of proceeding in thought ... from laws or principles to their consequences" and, more appositely for us, "the putting together of parts or elements so as to make up a complex whole". These are conscious processes of thought, quite different from the guidance that "opposition" and "analogy", say, and other such relational concepts can be inferred to have lent subliminally or tacitly to the elaboration of social systems. "Positing", similarly, is an operation of thought: Given $x$, let $y$ be its opposite. In certain cases, it is true, such processes can be shown to have occurred: in the Nihonjinron literature, for instance, it is often apparent that authors do indeed construct what can be represented as lists of opposed pairs in this conscious way. Taking a particular characteristic (as it is perceived to be) of the Japanese, such as silence, or of the Japanese language, such as poetic, or of Japanese society, such as verticality, an opposite to it (talkativeness, scientific, or horizontality) is then said to be (is posited as) characteristic of the opposite of Japan and the Japanese, i.e., generally "the West" and "Westerners". Or the pairs might be constructed the other way round. But when we consider Balinese ideology, for instance, where we are confronted by various such oppositions, there is no evidence whatsoever to support the suggestion that one term of a dyad which is opposed to the other term or terms of the dyad was originally posited by someone as the opposite of the other or others. Indeed, there is good reason to think that this could not have occurred at all generally. It requires that one of the terms once stood alone, as it were. It is not conceivable, however, that terms such as high, right, hot, sun, male ever were isolated from their opposites (low, left, cool, moon, female under one aspect): each requires the other in that each is defined in terms of its opposite.

Apart from these considerations, an intellectualist approach to the construction of ideologies appears to assume that people cogitate and most of the time. In dealing with the construction of ideologies,
though, as they appear to us now, we may be said to be seeking their origins. Allowing for the sake of argument that it is useful even to consider such matters [and Evans-Pritchard, for one authority, was very scathing about the usefulness of such attempts (e.g., 1965: 101)], the most compelling accounts, such as those of Andrew Lang (e.g., 1905), suggest that it was not the intellect, and such processes as positing and synthesis, but the imagination and its “operations” (see post) which were basic to original forms of life. The next general comment about Witherspoon’s hypothesis that should be made is, that in alluding to a starting-point, and by his use of “then” and “expanded”, he renders his hypothesis concerned with events and therefore with a time scale. This is not surprising: with categories, events and a time scale are premises of any form of social action, as Needham points out (1983: 144-145). What it is important to notice, however, is that Witherspoon’s hypothesis suggests an historical consideration. Again, there is nothing that should surprise in this: it is, indeed, a sign of the fundamental character of the hypothesis, for “it will always be essential in comparative studies to begin with historical considerations—and only if they fail to supply an answer will it be justifiable to resort to other factors . . .” (Needham 1970: xxxvi-xxxvii).

There is no gainsaying this, but, with the best will in the world, it scarcely seems possible to consider the constitution of Balinese ideology historically, at least as things now stand. Very little is known about the internal history of Lombok, and what is known does not deal with matters that could help the present investigation.

An obvious recourse, here, is to the history of Bali. Indigenous sources—such as inscriptions, traditional “histories”, local chronicles (babad)—are numerous, while non-Balinese writers, especially Dutch and English, have written extensively about various aspects of the history of Bali.

This wealth of sources, however, cannot aid us here. First, the
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“traditional” view, around which much that was taken to be understanding of Bali and of Balinese life revolved, that Bali was conquered by the Javanese kingdom of Majapahit in 1343 and that there was a subsequent influx of high-ranking Javanese (the antecedents of present-day Balinese *triwangs*) has been very much cast into doubt by the recent work of Schulte Nordholt (e.g., 1986a; 1986b). Schulte Nordholt maintains among other matters that the court of Klungkung, which succeeded to the jural authority of the previous royal centre of Gelgel in 1686, legitimized this take-over by recourse to a fictional past. This fiction, contained in *babad* and put with the contents of the 14th century Javanese *Nagarakertagama*, was the basis for historians’ accounts. These cannot now be accepted unqualifiedly, nor can they be relied upon here. And even if they could be, they do not, as what accounts of the history of Lombok that exist do not, address matters which are germane to the present enquiry.

One indisputable point about the Balinese is that their forms of life are admixtures of social facts. Some of these derive, more or less directly, from China, some from India, some, perhaps, from other parts of southeast Asia, while others might be considered indigenous to Bali. Given, moreover, that “no migratory connection can be presumed to be out of the question...” (Needham 1980: 32), it cannot be assumed that Balinese life has not been fecundated, to use Bosch’s word (1961: 20-21), by other, as yet unconsidered, forms of life. Some scholars such as Swellengrebel (e.g., 1961: 27-30) separated some of the “early, indigenous cultural elements” from “cultural elements of Hindu or Hindu-Javanese origin”. Goris, by contrast, had earlier written (1937: 281) that “every endeavour to separate the two sources of culture in Balinese reality [which he narrowly identified as old Indonesian and Hindu] is foredoomed to failure”.

Students of the Balinese, both of those on Bali and on Lombok,
incline these days to Goris's view, I think; or else consider that the
task of unravelling the various aspects of Balinese life, especially
on the scale that successful investigations of the kind necessarily
imply, would not sufficiently reward the time and the effort which
it would require. I take no stand either way: such investigations,
after all, are best judged by the results that they procure. But in
any case, so long as such studies are not based on reliable evidences,
they remain (like Swellengrebel's attempt) simply erudite guesswork.
As such, they will again not serve the present purpose.

There is a way out of all this though. I do not refer to that
which Evans-Pritchard might be thought to provide us with: if, as
he says (see n. 12), science deals with relations and not with origins,
we could say that therefore it is not scientific to consider origins.
But our work should be scientific—so we will suspend attention to
Witherspoon's hypothesis which, with its allusions to a starting-point,
presses us in the direction of origins. This would be fine were there
reliable evidences to hand. In the Balinese case, though, there are
not. So the hypothesis is, again, to be left to one side.

That approach to the matter is rather defeatist. A preferable way
out is provided by Wittgenstein who, in his remarks (1967) on The
Golden Bough, suggests that a reconstruction cast in historical terms
can also be read more formally: chronological development can be
read out, so to say, so that the data are left to be viewed in their
relation one to another and as composing a general picture. This
approach has proved illuminating in the consideration of Andrew
Lang's views about the move from pre-social to social man (cf., Duff-
Cooper 1986b: 200-201), and it will be adopted here. Likely objec-
tions to an approach which, in eschewing history, might be thought
to be static, not to move, are taken up below.
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III Witherspoon's Hypothesis: Particulars

The hypothesis suggests, first, that "all cultures are constructed from and based on a single metaphysical principle which is axiomatic, unexplainable, and unprovable". Naturally, if it turns out that one "culture", such as the Balinese, is not so constructed and based, the hypothesis falls. Before we can turn to a consideration of that issue, though, we should consider from and upon what (by the hypothesis) cultures are constructed and based.

A principle is, for instance, a proposition that is primary (Lat. princeps: first in time or place), where by "primary" is meant that neither the proposition nor what it is about derive from anything else.

The hypothesis suggests that this principle is single, that is to say, that it stands alone: historically, it was first; logically, it underpins the rest of the system or is its source. It suggests, too, that this single principle which is the foundation or beginning of the system is metaphysical.

This epithet has six main meanings according to the Oxford dictionary. Three do not concern the present enquiry. One use of the word, as a term applied with reproach to over-subtle or abstract reasoning, is not likely to have been intended by Witherspoon, given the formal terms—opposition, analogy—in which the rest of the hypothesis is couched. The two other meanings are: "Based on abstract reasoning" and "applied to what is immaterial, incorporeal, and supersensible".

It may be that Witherspoon intended "metaphysical" in the first of these two senses. If he did so, there are a number of grounds for thinking that it was inappropriate to do so. For a proposition and what it is about to be agreed to be based on reasoning, some evidence that reasoning preceded the formulation of the proposition is required. In the nature of the present case, it is most unlikely
that such evidence, as opposed to evidence *post hoc*, could ever be supplied; and in view of the claim (*supra*) that people are, so to say, disinclined to thought, as well as there being evidence in at least one case that a writer's ideas were *not* based upon reasoning, abstract or otherwise, but simply occurred to him in a crowd, unexpectedly (cf., Duff-Cooper 1986b: 193, 203 n. 92), that a principle that is metaphysical in this sense functions as the hypothesis suggests in not at all plausible. It will be seen later, also, that it would not be appropriate to the Balinese case.

The use of "metaphysical" in this sense, moreover, would conflict with the principle being axiomatic. An axiom is not considered, generally, to require demonstration. But the abstract reasoning which would, on this usage of "metaphysical", have led to the formulation of the principle would demonstrate the soundness of the principle (if the reasoning were sound).

Yet according to the hypothesis, the principle is unexplainable: what it is about cannot be accounted for. If sound reasoning preceded its formulation, the principle would clearly not be unexplainable.

However, this reasoning being abstract would accord with the principle being unproveable (as the hypothesis suggests), at least in the sense of this word as of finding something to be something by experience: abstract reasoning does not rely upon experience (except perhaps of such reasoning) to test the correctness of a proposition. But, as the principle is axiomatic, it is (generally) not thought to require such assessment. The hypothesis would here, again, be flawed.

Understanding "metaphysical" as referring to what is immaterial, incorporeal, and supersensible, though, leads to none of these difficulties. The hypothesis is therefore best understood as suggesting that all cultures are constructed from and based on a principle that concerns what is immaterial, incorporeal, and supersensible.

To suggest further that this principle is axiomatic, unexplainable,
and unproveable, however, appears to be pleonastic and perhaps simply rhetorical. A principle has so fundamental a character in the formulation of a system of thought that is might be said to be axiomatic to that system. As such, a principle, and especially one which is metaphysical in the chosen sense, is not generally expected to be in need of explanation or proof.

This general expectation is in line with logic: the logical efficacy of a supposition such as a principle "does not depend on its being true, nor even on its being thought true, but only on its being supposed." (Collingwood 1940: 52), which is just as well because a supposition such as a principle "cannot be undermined by the verdict of "experience",..." (Collingwood 1940: 193-194) because it is what provides the underpinnings of the system of thought through which experience is given sense. But, in any case, explainable and proveable or not, people in general do not appear to consider the truth or falsity of the ideas which form the ideological world in which they live, as Lord Raglan (e.g., 1949: 13) makes clear. Questions of explanation and proof, that is, are logically and experientially alien to what we are involved with examining.20.

The fundamental character of a principle (it has been noted) renders it the basis of a system of thought. More precisely, that it is the source or the origin or the beginning of the system. To say that all cultures are constructed from a principle is perhaps too active an expression for our purposes. We do not wish to forejudge the issue, but "construction" appears to imply creation and conscious deliberation. It may not do so, but it might. It is, of course, consonant with the second part of the hypothesis that alludes to "synthesis". This operation of thought is open to certain objections (supra) and it will be seen (post, sec. IV) that in considering Balinese ideology "synthesis" cannot reliably be attributed to Balinese people. We will, therefore, suspend attention to "construction". Whether the reasons against this way of viewing the formation of this ideology
are cogent, the operation of construction necessarily takes place in time, it appeals to an historical account, and that is not to be had. We will instead concentrate upon, first, the proposition that Balinese ideology is based on a single metaphysical principle. Then we will consider whether this principle is opposed, and whether it and its opposite (if any) is, next, expanded into "a more complex structure" through the employment of analogy and opposition; the matter of "synthesis" will also be addressed again.

IV Witherspoon's Hypothesis and Balinese Ideology

After addressing these general and particular aspects of Witherspoon's hypothesis at considerable but indispensible length, we now take up the question: Is Balinese ideology based on a single metaphysical principle, in the stipulated senses of these words?

Some time ago Cassirer wrote (1929: 221) that whatever contexts one may isolate from a totality of experience, "always their orders will show a definite structure and a common fundamental character". This assertion has been shown, implicitly, to hold in the case of Balinese ideology: a series of studies has demonstrated that contexts that constitute indigenously defined aspects of this ideology do indeed evince a definite structure; it also shows that these contexts have a common fundamental character: they are shot through by Ida Sang Hyang Vidhi (cf., supra; n. 10).

This pervasiveness of Vidhi was expectable in the light of the teaching of Balinese metaphysics (sarva-surya) that Vidhi is "everywhere" (sarvagatah).

The first sense\(^1\) in which Vidhi is "everywhere" is the social fact that everything in the Balinese universe derives from Vidhi as Sang Bindu, the point or dot (cf., supra). But Vidhi did not cause the universe and everything in it, any more than the union of semen virile (kama putih) and blood (kama bang) causes life. The union

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of these two aspects of the male and the female is life. Vidhi—in one guise, as we shall see, a dualistic unity—is the potential for life, while the union of the constituent aspects of Vidhi is the aspect of life in question.

Vidhi, for instance, is *pradhana purusa*, a unity composed of the female principle (*pradhana*) and the male principle (*purusa*).\(^{22}\) On some accounts, the female and the male principles are the two aspects of Vidhi out of which emerged all the elements that, in various combinations, comprise all the aspects of the universe. As such they are prior, both logically and in time, to all other aspects of the world. In as much, though, as *pradhana* and *purusa* constitute Vidhi—exemplified in Ardhanaśīvāra, the icon that is half male and half female—it may legitimately be claimed that Vidhi is the origin of the universe, under this aspect at least.

In Balinese ideology, material empirical individuals are constituted of three “bodies” (*tri sarira*). These bodies—the physical body, the sensations and functions of a person, and a person’s soul—are all aspects of Vidhi. The physical body is composed of such elements as *pertivi* (everything solid and hard), *apah* (liquids), and *akasa* (whatever is a vacuum). The “second” body, the *suksma sarira*, consists of the five senses (*panca budhi indria*) and the five “movements” (*panca karma indria*). The “third” body (*antakarana sarira*), is what animates human beings: this body may be called the soul (*atman*). This last is to Vidhi as sunlight is to the sungod, Bhatara (god, protector) Surya, and as befits its closeness to Vidhi, is associated with the aspect of the god Siva which is closest to the centre, Parama Siva. The second and the third bodies are relatively less and least close to the centre, and are associated with Sada Siva and with Siva respectively. These three aspects of Siva constitute Vidhi. In both these ways, therefore, Vidhi is the basis of and origin of human beings. Those who achieve freedom from rebirth (*moksa*) are reunited with Vidhi after death, through burial (perhaps) and
cremation.

An empirical individual's character and the thoughts and the actions to which he or she is predisposed are determined (vidhi, destiny, fate) by the configuration of the three qualities (tri guna), sattwa, rajah, and tamas, which, under various influences, he or she is born with. I have already gone into these matters at some length (Duff-Cooper 1985a), so I can be brief on this score. These three qualities, the propensity of people for certain kinds of action, and their birth into a particular estate ["caste", varna or bangsa (see n. 15)] are all correlated, and they are all correlated with the three bodies. The three qualities are aspects of Vidhi, and as such Vidhi is the basis of an empirical individual's character.

Vidhi, next, is the epitome of beauty by Balinese standards of the matter.28 Notions of beauty are based upon the idea of Vidhi as the epicentre of Balinese life. Fineness or coarseness are guaged by reference to the standing of an entity relative to a centre. Whatever is closer to a particular centre or point of reference is, generally, finer (or should be so) than what is more distant from the same point or centre. This closeness and distance may be expressed in terms of the dyad high/low or it may be assessed horizontally, as it were, by reference to a central point. Balinese aesthetics, that is, is based upon the conception of Vidhi as perfection, and the standing of an entity relative to an analogue of Vidhi determines the fineness of that entity relative to that analogue. The pig-sty and refuse-pit in a Balinese compound are always placed at the opposite point within its boundaries from the family temple (mrajan peneg-tegan/sanggah kemulan) which, in this context, may be considered the centre of reference. This position indicates the lack of fineness of the pigs and of the refuse: here one urinates too; one only enters a temple formally dressed, and menstruating women, associated analogously with the sea and the impurity of death, do not do so ever. Vidhi is in these senses again the basis of Balinese ideology.
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We have already noted that Vidhi is a dualistic unity. This unity may be expressed in the three gods, Brahma, Visnu, and Siva. Brahma and Visnu are opposed as seawards is opposed to mountainwards, and in many other ways (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1985d). Siva in this triad, however, is "less the linking intermediary member than it is the higher, synthesizing unity of which the other two are individual aspects" (Swellengrebel 1960: 45-46). These three gods may be expressed as four, as five, as eight, as nine, and as eleven. These modes of division classify both aspects of the cosmos—macro- and microcosm—and by the values which Balinese ideology ascribes the various directions with which each god is associated—south, north, centre; north, south, east, west; these four directions and centre; the four cardinal and intermediate points; these eight points plus centre; these nine points, with zenith and nadir—and their attributes, colours, and standing relative to the central point (which may be "real" or notional) of each variously partitioned entity, pervade the lives of all Balinese people, down to such seemingly private aspects of their lives as sexual activity (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1985f). Vidhi, that is, the basis of Balinese ideology in these ways also.  

The Balinese form of life, next, is diarchic: the powers to which the Balinese were traditionally subject were divided between the Brahmana and the Ksatriya estates, whose duty (dharma) it was to attend to the mystical and the jural aspects of these powers respectively. Similar divisions were evinced at each "level" of the realm, down to the village (kaklianan). The "king" (Anak Agung in Pagutan) and the Brahmana priest can be interpreted as constituting a dualistic unity that replicates Vidhi (Duff-Cooper 1986c). These days, the jural functions that were exercised by the Ksatriya, either on their own behalf, as it were, or on behalf of the Dutch, are exercised by officials and the organs of the Indonesian government. Balinese life remains diarchic, although few would suggest that the
national institutions of jural control (except perhaps in the village) bear much resemblance to the authority which a king exercised as a matter of “sacred” duty.

Exchanges, also, may be considered as replications of Vidhi, even those that evince the greatest asymmetry between the buyer and the seller of goods and/or services (e.g., Duff-Cooper 1987d). But it is precisely because of the lack of rigidity of Balinese ideology that such aspects of the Balinese world, as they now are, as tourists can be accommodated by it (see n. 24).

Vidhi, finally here, is also Ida Sang Hyang Sunya, the Void, which may be understood as evincing perfect bilateral symmetry. All the contexts of Balinese ideology that have to date been isolated for analysis by the present writer evince a definite structure. They are all framed by some or all of a limited set of principles of order. These principles of order are transformations of Vidhi as Sunya, perfect bilateral symmetry. These principles are: Modes of partition: as we have seen a unity may be divided, most significantly, into two, three, four, and so on. Symmetrical relations or asymmetrical relations of one of four increasing degrees may obtain among the various entities into which a unity is divided: the greater the disparity in the standing of entities relative to the central point of reference, the greater the asymmetry of the relations that obtain, and vice versa (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1987d); modes of periodicity: the entities that comprise unities divided most commonly into two, three, four, five, and nine may constitute series—these series may move physically, as in the ringing of a Brahmana priest’s prayer-bell and in some activities connected with rice-growing (Duff-Cooper 1986d; forthcoming-a); and sometimes the constituent entities of a unity may be reversed about a central point enantiomorphically—this central point itself being symmetrical or occurring only once in the series, both of which render this central point analagous to Vidhi.
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These principles of order may, as mentioned, be considered as transformations of Vidhi: modes of partition, of Vidhi as a dualistic unity; asymmetrical relations, of Vidhi as Sunya, perfect bilateral symmetry; modes of periodicity, as dynamic expressions of modes of partition; enantiomorphlc reversal, as an operation which is evinced by aspects of the world [such as the superiority of the Brahmana priest over the Ksatrya king which is sometimes, but only ever temporarily, reversed (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1985d: 245-246)], which are themselves aspects of Vidhi. In all cases, the forms of Vidhi are transformations of Vidhi as a dualistic unity.

On the social facts summarily presented above, but which have been described lengthily and in detail in other studies, it can be said that in the senses alluded to Balinese ideology is based on Vidhi as a dualistic unity.

There are further grounds for thinking that this conclusion is not wrong-headed. First, the cone which depicts the structure of the Balinese form of life (Duff-Cooper 1986a: 235, Figs. IVa, IVb) “sits” on division into nine which is, of course, a complex form of Vidhi as a dualistic unity. Next, the normal development of social forms is “in the direction of increasing intricacy”: “wherever we have good testimony to structural change... the outcome has been a greater complexity” (Needham 1984: 229). These authoritative conclusions are, of course, cast in an historical (evolutionary) idiom, but as before this can be read out. What is left is a formal development—a cline of transformations—from the simpler to the more complex. The plausible inference is, then, that Vidhi in the simplest discernible form is the basis of Balinese ideology. This form is as a unity that is dualistic.

Then, “a transformation in the direction of... simplicity of structure... is not formally self-contradictory or otherwise invalid, but it is empirically improbable” (Needham 1984: 229). In the Balinese case, therefore, it is more in line with empirical probability that
partition into four and other numerically more complex modes, asymmetrical relations, the modes of periodicity, and the reversals evolved out of and are subsequent to the simplest form of Vidhi than that the process was the other way round, a process of contraction, as it were, not one of expansion and elaboration. Our formal depiction is consonant with empirical probability and it may be read as a hypothesis of development that can be tested (when they are available) against historical evidences.

Again, it has been suggested (see n. 10) that Vidhi is arguably "Divinity as order, what orders...". Although these formulations are, perhaps, a little vague, they support the findings of earlier analyses adduced above and, as such, they support the contention that Vidhi is the basis of Balinese ideology.

Finally, support for our contention is to be had from two other sources. The first is Balinese ideology itself which, in an evolutionary idiom [but one which is not in my view to be understood causally (Duff-Cooper 1987a: 117)], suggests that the Balinese form of life derives from Vidhi. Understood correlative, this affirmation suggests again that Vidhi in various forms, and describable in various ways, is the principle we set out to investigate in relation to our data. Here, the second source of support is Needham who writes (1980: 94), entirely cogently, that "it is precisely what one expects of a principle that it should assume a variety of forms, and that these forms should be describable by a number of alternative labels".

On the evidences adduced above, therefore, and with the support of the sources just mentioned, Vidhi as a dualistic unity is the principle to which our attention was directed by Witherspoon's hypothesis. Vidhi is axiomatic, in that questions concerning the existence and the rest of this god do not generally arise (see n. 20); and questions of explanation and proof do not do so either. But is this principle "metaphysical", i.e., is it immaterial, incorporeal, and supersensible?

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In some guises, such as the soul and the sensations and functions mentioned above, Vidhi belongs to the realm of what is timeless, essential, and generally invisible (niskala); then Vidhi is bodiless (avikara), is not perceivable by the senses [acintya (unknowable)], eternal (nitya), and changeless (sthām). In other guises, such as the physical body (sthula sarīra or badan kāsar), the married couple, or an offering, which belong to the realm of what is in time, material, and generally visible, Vidhi takes forms that are corporeal, not supersensible, and, by definition, not immaterial. The latter, indeed, are the only way in which the former can be apprehended (cf., Duff-Cooper 1985g: 161).

This result was expectable: sakala and niskala are “classes that overlap in various ways…” (Hobart 1986: 25 n. 5; cf., Duff-Cooper 1985e: 18), and if human beings such as particularly able witches [Jēak (e.g., De Kat Angelino 1921)] can move from one class to another, it is hardly surprising that the highest god in the Balinese pantheon is also represented as doing so. The result does not, however, mean that the answer to the question Is this principle metaphysical? is: Yes and no. That is, the guises that Vidhi takes in the material realm are articulations of abstractions; they do not depict Vidhi in various guises; they allow the various guises in which Vidhi as a dualistic unity can appear to be conceived (cf., Needham 1983: 17, 165; Duff-Cooper 1986a: 229, 244 n. 9). That is, this principle is indeed metaphysical.

Witherspoon’s hypothesis, next, suggests that an opposition is then posited to this premise (sc. the single metaphysical principle). Some of the reasons for thinking that “positing” is not altogether happy have been given already. Even allowing that appositeness of “posit”, though, it does not appear that at this point Balinese ideology bears out the hypothesis. So far as my understanding goes, there is no opposition posited to Vidhi as a dualistic unity. I am not able even to suggest here a candidate for consideration as the opposition that

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Witherspoon suggests.

By contrast, his suggestion that the basic principle is "expanded" into a more complex structure utilizing analogy and opposition is very much to the point. Opposition pervades Balinese ideology in the sense that from Vidhi onward, as it were, one entity is opposed to another in combination with other entities of gradually increasing numerical complexity (i.e., from dichotomy or bipartition to division into eleven). Again, that opposition should be so much evinced was expectable: opposition is a relation within dyads. Vidhi as a dyadic unity pervades Balinese ideology, and it is not surprising that opposition also does so. Notwithstanding the number of entities into which a unity, such as the four estates [catur varna (see n. 15)] is divided, the entities are opposed one to another dyadically (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1985g: 163).

The terms of all dyads are not all related in the same way, however: they may be opposed symmetrically or to one of four increasing degrees of asymmetry (supra). By virtue of the relations that may obtain within dyads, therefore, there exist, formally at least, five sets of analogously related dyads, some of which are set out elsewhere (Duff-Cooper 1987d: Tables; post).26

The terms on, so to say, each side of each set of these dyads are homologues. They are rendered unitary by these modes of relation and by the terms of the sets of dyads being patterned by reference to points (centres) of reference.

Witherspoon's hypothesis is therefore correct, as far as it goes, in suggesting that analogy and opposition are employed in the construction of, in this case, Balinese ideology. Homology, though, also figures prominently, as does the notion of centre or point of reference.

What about the place of "synthesis" to which Witherspoon alludes? This action of thought cannot be attributed to any Balinese people I know, nor is there any evidence in the literature that I am aware of that Balinese people put together the parts or the elements of
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their form of life, as they discriminate them, to make up a complex whole—although some people I know did express to me an idea which approximates Cassirer's (*supra*) notion of "a totality of experience", that is, all aspects of a Balinese form of life (*dharma*) as it conventionally is at a particular historical moment in a particular village or agglomeration of villages (*desa* or *lurah*).27 This idea may, of course, be the product of "synthesis", but there is no evidence that it results from so active a mental operation.

On the other hand, the social anthropologist (characteristically) has to compose his or her own understanding of an ideology and of the institutions that compose the framework of social life into a synthetic interpretation (cf., e.g., Needham 1981: 18). It seems likely that if "synthesis" enters into the construction of an ideology, it does so at that point, not in the main with the people whose ideology is under study, who are generally too busy, after all, living their ideology to expend the time and the efforts of imagination and systematic construction that such synthesis requires. Nor, generally, and particularly in the Balinese case, are people of the critical cast of mind that such enquiries demand (cf., Needham 1981: 76-77; Duff-Cooper 1987g).

In the case of Balinese ideology, at any rate, it can be conceived synthetically on the basis of the principles of order that frame its various constituent contexts. As Witherspoon suggests, it is based on a single metaphysical principle which is expanded into a more complex structure by the employment of modes of partition, symmetry and asymmetry, modes of periodicity, transformations such as enantiomorphic reversal, and by the relations of analogy, homology, and opposition.

V Imaginative Aspects of Balinese Ideology

The earlier consideration of Balinese ideology, consonant with the
terms in which Witherspoon couches his hypothesis, addressed its cognitive aspects. We now turn to what may be called its imaginative aspects. Needham writes that "it is a matter of common knowledge that different societies resort in very different degrees to symbolic classification in the running of their affairs. Some appear to be dominated by it; others almost dispense with it" (1979: 70). The Balinese form of life is of the former kind,26 as can be gauged from Duff-Cooper (1983) and from other studies, including Hobart's study about The Search for Sustenance (1980).

In the present section we consider only the symbolic vehicles which are employed to express whatever it is that they do express in Balinese life. Their meanings have been addressed elsewhere (supra), and to attempt to do so here would take us too far afield for the present purpose.

The table (after Duff-Cooper 1985d: 244 Table 4) lists a number of dyads, or pairs of opposed terms,28 as they were adduced in the course of the analysis in which they appear. This is the case, in the first place, because the relation of opposition obtains within each of the dyads, which are therefore analogues, formally speaking, one of another (see n. 26). It is true that this is only so when the relation of opposition is taken in what Needham calls (1980: 55) "a very abstract and accommodating sense...": when the various modes of opposition mentioned in section IV above are taken into account, the matter is very much more complicated. But that is not the point at issue here. Our focus of attention, rather, is the terms that are opposed and that constitute each dyad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table: Partial Balinese Symbolic Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inside : outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male : female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>older : younger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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| senior      | : | junior       |
| superior    | : | inferior     |
| east        | : | west         |
| mountain    | : | sea          |
| right       | : | left         |
| front       | : | back         |
| gods        | : | witches      |
| white       | : | black        |
| high        | : | low          |
| upstream    | : | downstream   |
| Pedanda Siva| : | Pedanda Boddha|
| Pedanda     | : | All others   |
| Pedanda (Brahmana) | : | Kings (Ksatriya) |
| Brahmana & Ksatriya | : | Wesia & Sudra |
| twice-born  | : | not twice-born |
| insiders    | : | outsiders    |
| pure        | : | less pure    |
| dharma      | : | adharma      |
| Balinese life | : | Indonesian (sc. Javanese) life |
| sun         | : | moon         |

The table (which is reproduced as it appeared but which would be revised in another study) shows that a number of familiar resources are called upon in the constitution of Balinese symbolic or analogical classification. Among the steady components of the scheme are the absolute spatial coordinators east/west (kangin/kauh), and the lateral values right/left (tengen/kiwa). Mountain (wards)/sea (wards) (kaler, kaja/kelod) are also components of the scheme, but they are not absolute; like right and left, they are relative: depending upon from which side of the mountain one is using these terms, seawards, for instance, may be either the northerly or southerly direction; mountainwards is similarly relative.

Other natural phenomena are invoked as symbolic vehicles, and
these—the sun and the moon—are equally familiar as symbolic components of such schemes, as the studies in *Right & Left* [Needham (ed.) 1973b] make plain.

Colours are also evinced by the scheme. Although only white and black appear as opposites in the table [what is what they are in certain contexts (see n. 28)], white may also be opposed to black and red (as in the opposition between the god Siva and the gods Visnu and Brahma respectively). These three colours, again, are called upon as constituents of such schemes by forms of life globally.

The pair “upstream/downstream” is an analogue of the pair of opposed terms, mountainwards/seawards. Yet “it is remarkable how generally in world ethnography we find, in what can be described as religions, a common and quite limited stock of symbolic resources...” (Needham 1981: 86), among which is water. In the Balinese case, some Balinese people and non-Balinese too refer to Balinese religion, as it may loosely be called, as *agama tirtha*. “Tirtha” is one of many kinds of water (*toya/yēh*) that are distinguished by Balinese ideology. In adopting “upstream” and “downstream” as analogues of most broadly high and low and as a metaphor, in the flow of water from the former to the latter, for proper order (cf., e.g., Weck 1937: 45; Hobart 1978a: 21), Balinese ideology has recourse, again, to a natural phenomenon that is a common religious, and indeed secular, symbol.

There are various other such things (in a pragmatic sense) that are also called upon by Balinese ideology. Numbers, for instance, especially the integers two, three, four, five, eight, and nine, have important symbolic associations for the Balinese. In such matters as the classification of the days of the weeks, and, for instance, in the rice-planting rice *nuasēn*, in aspects of Balinese music, and in housebuilding, numbers figure prominently. Balinese ideology, also, discriminates between the series of odd numbers, associated with life and male, and the series of even numbers, associated with death
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and female (and with other analogously opposed terms). These social facts are hardly surprising: "In ascribing a systematic importance to things, or in marking distinctions, men constantly resort to numbers" (Needham 1978: 10).

The proclivity of people to rely upon animals, and trees and plants, as symbolic vehicles, as well as upon natural phenomena, is often referred to as totemism. The Balinese are "totemic" in that sense of this word: the bull, the lion, the deer, the pig, the rat, as well as dogs and cats, are all invested with meanings and associations; certain reptiles and insects are symbolic; while Hobart shows (1978b: 60-66) that numerous plants have various associations in rice-growing, as they do, with certain trees, in all rites, from those associated with mask-making and house-building to those of marriages and the birth and social development of a child to burials and cremations. Flowers, also, form a part of every rite. Natural phenomena, in addition to those already mentioned, such as shooting-stars, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tremors, lightning, thunder, rain, and sunlight, are all also symbolic vehicles to which Balinese ideology has recourse.

Smells and scents are commonly employed to stand for other things. The smell of a Caucasian, before he or she has been purified by a diet of rice and other foods normally eaten by the Balinese and through the use of holy water (matirtha), stands for the impurity of such a person and for his or her ideological distance from the Balinese; the smell of a menstruating woman (as it is taken to sometimes be) is associated with her (temporary) impurity. The scents of incense and the sandalwood flower are symbols of the sweetness and the beauty of the high gods, and especially of the goddess of beauty and learning, Sarasvati, and of those who daily come into contact with them, such as Pedanda (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1984: 31, 42 n. 40). Scents can purify, when carried by smoke, while the cenane flower is an especially strong protector against black magic.
Percussion is prominent as a symbol in widely disparate cultures, and it is commonly associated with rites of passage that effect a transition from one state to another (cf., e.g., Needham 1981: 40–41, 48). In Balinese life, equally, percussion is in various ways an aspect of very many such occasions, extraordinary or more everyday, be it made by women pounding rice, a Balinese orchestra (gong), music on the radio or on cassettes, or by a Pedanda’s prayer-bell.

The Balinese also resort to material values in the assessment of what Needham calls (1978: 9) “human virtues”. Women who are “hot” (panes/kebus) are said to be sexually exciting; but men who get “hot” through the excitement of the cockfight and other forms of gambling or through drinking too much alcohol, are then in a state which is much deprecated. What is “cool” (etis), including certain marriages (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1984b: 495), as well as people’s normal demeanour, state of health, and responses to good and ill-fortune, is more highly regarded by the Balinese.

This latter metaphor brings us to “elevation”. This symbolic recourse is pervasive in Balinese life, and it is an aspect of the social fact that what is closer to a centre or point of reference is finer than what is further away from the same centre or point. “Elevation” may be expressed either vertically or horizontally. In both cases, the Balinese recourse to this way of expressing whatever happens to be expressed is consonant with the recourse that Balinese ideology has to other things that have a global incidence as symbolic vehicles.

Another way of approaching the study of an ideology is within the more limited context of what has come to be termed a “field of anthropological study” (FAS); and within such a field, by way of the notion “metaphors for living” (Fox 1981; cf. Barnes 1985b: 222). Among these metaphors are relative age categories, such as elder/younger (cf., Table, supra), and “the shared social category
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of the house for descent groupings..." (Barnes 1985a: 104). Both these metaphors are employed by the Balinese in the organisation of their form of life (e.g., Duff-Cooper 1984b; 1985h). It is true that such metaphors may not have the global incidence that is attributable to the other matters addressed above in the present section. Still, these metaphors have a territorial span in eastern Indonesia that is impressive, given the cultural disparity of the peoples among whom they are discernible. The same may be said of the discrimination "inside/outside", which is probably as widely spread, if not more so, than those metaphors.

"Paradigmatic scenes" also attribute order and meaning to human life. "These [scenes] are in the main affective and iconic, and their impact is such as to convey a sense of deep and directive significance in the interpretation of human experience..." (Needham 1985: 67; cf., idem 1981: 88-89). Paradigmatic scenes may be viewed as instances of "condensation": they "condense the characteristic features of large sets of various particulars into an economy of manageable concepts" (Needham 1985: 69-70).

The most profitable way to stipulate paradigmatic scenes is by giving examples of them. Among Needham’s examples are the Crucifixion and Śiva Ardhanārīśvāra. The latter, of course, occupies a prime place in Balinese ideology. Like various other aspects of Balinese metaphysics, though, it is supposed to be secret: to disclose its meaning could risk losing what might be called its power (Bagus 1980). [I well remember Pedanda Gde’s (see n. 8) look of shocked amazement when I tried to prod him into being more forthcoming about what he should in any case not have been sharing with me by dropping the name of Ardhanārīśvāra into the conversation]. As such, it is not a paradigmatic scene which in this regard is comparable with the Crucifixion and with the "range of domestic, erotic, and natural situations such as have become standard resources for pictorial advertisements in the commercial press" to which Needham

More akin to these paradigmatic scenes are what I should claim is another: that of the couple Jayaprana and Layon Sari, who individually evince the characteristics—bravery, fearlessness, pride, loyalty, handsomeness; loyalty, modesty, beauty, constancy—that are among those which a Balinese man and a woman ideally possess; and who together constitute a paradigm of what a Balinese couple should be like, both in the dealings that the couple has with others, and in those that each member of it has with the other.

Balinese ideology, next, exhibits examples of apotropaic masks—those of the Barong and of Rangda, symbolising order and disorder, good and evil respectively—and indeed Napier uses these examples of such masks in his admirable study (Napier 1986) that establishes that such a mask is an autonomous natural symbol, that is, "a psychic constant in the form of an autonomous image to which the human mind is naturally predisposed" (Needham 1978: 45). On Lombok, it is true, these masks and the dances during temple festivals during which they generally make an appearance are not so common as they are on Bali. But these masks and the images that they represent are a part of the cultural heritage of the Balinese on Lombok of which they are well aware, so that their mention here is not out of order.

Another such archetype that Balinese ideology evinces is the image of the witch. This synthetic image is characterised by certain factors: opposition, inversion, darkness, colour, animals, flight, and nocturnal lights. These factors are all evinced by the léak. She, or infrequently he, is the very opposite of all the right values of Balinese ideology; the formulas (mantra) that a witch employs are the reverse of those used by others, such as Pedanda, in their rites, while the witch's normal ugliness and her association with the temple of death, always situated to the south, is an inversion of the Balinese view of themselves as a handsome people, a people who avoid any-
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thing connected with death, especially that temple, as far as they can; the witch generally operates at night, under cover of darkness; the witch is associated with fire and thence with the colour red, that of Brahma, associated with the south and the temple of death;\(^2\) the witch may use a dog or a fly to do her work for her, or may change herself into a dog, a cat, or a chicken to do her worst; a witch, like other Balinese of supernormal status, may be able to fly; and as for nocturnal lights, one night I was wakened by my friend to come out onto the verandah of our house to see a witch: it was a will-o' the-wisp, dancing on the south wall of the compound above the cow-stall there.

Balinese ideology also evinces the image of the shaman (e.g., Eliade 1964). This synthetic image combines the relations and the phenomena that we have just considered in relation to the witch. The semantic values of these, however, are the opposites of those that attach to them in that case. This social fact was expectable when we consider that the Balinese version of the shaman [a Pedanda, for example (see n. 8)] is opposed to the witch as white is opposed to black, as right is opposed to left, as mountainwards is opposed to seawards, as high is to low, as light is opposed to darkness [another “universal image” (Needham 1978: 36)], and as male is opposed to female.

A Pedanda is the apotheosis (qua his, or infrequently her, status) of all that is finest in the middle world (madyapada), the realm of material human beings (mertypada). In this, a Pedanda may be said to be opposed to more normal Balinese people, who should be neither too good nor too evil: “what exists may always transform ... into its opposite (tengalik), especially under conditions of excess ...” (Hobart 1986: 3); a Pedanda is the finest status and the finest looking [bagus (male) or ayu (female), as two Brahmana appellations, Ida Bagus ... (male) and Ida Ayu ... (female), imply], again an inversion of the more normal run-of-the-mill handsomeness or beauty of the

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Balinese; a Pedanda worships the sun [surya-sevana (e.g., Hooykaas 1966)], meditates most often by day, and on Lombok at least wears clothes of white and yellow, as opposed to the drab browns and purples of the old, often said to be witches if they are female and ugly and haggish; a Pedanda can use dogs (white ones), for instance to do his work, white magic, akin to the role of the Barong, for him, and is often said to be able to fly.

A Pedanda is not, however, associated with nocturnal lights. This is expectable, in that this public status in Balinese life, which is opposed to the hidden or private status of the witch, is associated with the sun and with daylight.

Those readers who are familiar with a form of Balinese life, or who are conversant with the topics of witches and witchcraft and shamans and shamanism, or both, will perhaps object that the matters to which we have just adverted do not exhaust the factors that combine to produce the images that we have considered; or they will perhaps point out that some of the factors which have been adduced are not characteristic of witches or shamans in other cultural settings. Such objections could surely well be sustained; but they do not weigh against the burden of the present case—that the Balinese Pedanda and the Balinese léak are examples of those “synthetic complexes of symbolic elements which cohere into regular and easily detected ideological images” that recur among forms of life of the most disparate kinds, that are “quickly recognizable”, and that are products “of imaginative inclinations which have an archetypal character” (Needham 1985: 66).

VI Conclusion

In setting out to take up Needham’s challenging contention about what remained to be done in the study of analogical classification, Witherspoon’s hypothesis was drawn upon. It was decided that the
hypothesis could be recast in more economical form by suspending attention to those parts of it that appeared to be overly intellectualist or pleonastic and rhetorical.

It was also concluded that although on various grounds the question of the development of (in this case) Balinese ideology was, in the first place, an historical matter, the data that are available are too exiguous and, after Schulte Nordholt’s essays (1986a; 1986b), too doubtful to be relied upon. A relational analysis was therefore chosen and carried out. It is to be emphasised that this analysis is not a kind of second-best. Historical analysis is only one way of addressing a form of life, after all; relational analysis is another way, and one the power of which has been proven time and again through the analysis of social facts.

Our analysis, in any case, leads to the finding that Witherspoon’s hypothesis is not entirely apt to the Balinese case. This form of life is based on a single metaphysical principle, but an opposition (one might say an antithesis to the basic thesis) is not posited to it. It is, rather, expanded through the employment of opposition and analogy (as Witherspoon suggests)—but also through the use of other relational constants. These are symmetry and asymmetry; homology; modes of formal partition, such as duality; and operations such as reversal and modes of periodicity. These operations, however, are not basic features of the scheme that Balinese ideology constitutes: they are subsidiary to the other relations mentioned that constitute the basic features of the scheme.

This scheme is synthetic, but (it was argued) not because Balinese people employ “synthesis” to render it so. It is so, rather, by virtue of the relations that constitute it and of the social anthropologist’s discernment of the synthetic totality that they create.

There are other “steady components” of the scheme: absolute spatial coordinators (east/west) and lateral values (right/left; mountainwards/seaward) anchor the symbolic resources that are organised
by the relations evinced by the scheme.

Among these symbolic resources are: natural phenomena; colour; water; numbers and the (opposed) series of odd and even numbers; totemism; smells and scents; percussion; material values; such "metaphors for living" as the relative age categories elder/younger the house, and inside/outside; paradigmatic scenes such as the bisexual icon Ardhanārīśvara and the couple Jayaprana and Layon Sari; apotropaic masks, such as those that depict the Barong, and the synthetic images of the witch and the shaman.31

It is not claimed that these resources exhaust those that could have been adduced. Cloth, metals, weapons, physical structures other than the house could have been mentioned. They have not been so, because the comparative study of these matters has not been brought to the point where it could incontestably be claimed that these things (in a pragmatic sense) are resorted to by forms of life globally as symbolic vehicles in the way that the other things adduced are.

The relational constants, the operations, and the symbolic vehicles that are evinced by Balinese ideology are all discernible in forms of life of very many kinds around the world. The former constitute what can be understood as cognitive (aspects of thought), the symbolic vehicles, as aspects of the human imagination. Some, doubtless, were diffused to Bali and Lombok in various ways and have been taken up by the Balinese; others are indigenous to Bali and latterly to the Balinese of Lombok. As historical studies of the Balinese of Lombok advance, it may be possible to stipulate with some degree of certainty which cultural artefacts, so to say, belong to which class. In the meantime, the present formal (relational) analysis, when read historically, provides an hypothesis of chronological development which requires testing against historical data. In the nature of the case, though, it seems unlikely that such data will be able to decide unequivocally the hypothesis, or aspects of it, for
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here we are dealing in part at least with origins, and for the most part they must remain conjectural.

One thing does seem to be certain, however. The cognitive and imaginative factors that we have highlighted here are most unlikely to have been contrived by acts of will: it is inherently improbable that in responding to the myriad circumstances of their particular form of life the Balinese should have arrived at the same "solutions" that are evinced by forms of life globally, themselves responding to their own particular circumstances. Human intention and foresight, that is, purpose and design, are unlikely to play any plausible role in any historical or other kind of evaluation of the hypothesis presented above or other thesis about the formation of Balinese ideology.

Before we conclude, one final matter deserves short comment. Schulte Nordholt, following Boon (e.g., 1977: 17), makes much (e.g., 1986a: 1-10) of the way in which since at least Raffles (1817) and Crawfurd (1820) and then from Friederich (1840/50) onwards, Bali has in the main been misrepresented by writers about its forms of life. He is scathing (as it seems to me) about what he calls the international Bohemian and romantic foreigners who were drawn to Bali by these misrepresentations; and who [like Covarrubias (1937), for instance] propogated these misrepresentations and reinforced them in their own work... Finally, Schulte Nordholt suggests, the Balinese acquiesced in this new cultural domination (1986b: 7), which went hand in hand with their political domination by the Dutch (cf., e.g., Schulte Nordholt 1986a: 51 n. 7).

Anyone who knows the Balinese, and the way in which they classify any non-Balinese, especially Caucasians and with the exceptions of Hindus from other parts of the world, will, perhaps, find it inherently improbable that foreign scholars and more or less permanent visitors to Bali could have so dominated the Balinese as to transform their ideology in the radical way—from endemic conflict and violence to an "Eastern paradise", "a dormant 'traditional'
society which, every so often, erupted with great rituals, but apart from this, lived on in a joyful, eternal and, above all, Eastern way” (Schulte Nordholt 1986a: 7, 8)—that Schulte Nordholt suggests. Of course, what he calls the *Pax Neerlandica* had a profound impact on Balinese life; but the misrepresentations must have had a measure of truth about them, otherwise those foreigners whom Schulte Nordholt accuses of misrepresenting Bali could not have done so, unless they just made it all up—and that is clearly not what they did.

In any case, Schulte Nordholt appears to forget that, like anything else, forms of life can be considered under various aspects, indeed that it is a methodical *desideratum* that they are. The identification of conflict and violence is a useful corrective to the view that Balinese forms of life are “all smiles and flowers” (as the expression Father Kersten once used to me goes). But he also appears to ignore the fact that neither his way of addressing Balinese life, for instance, nor any other way, can be right or wrong, but simply different one from another. Each perspective may include errors of fact and of interpretation, but *qua* perspective none can be wrong (and rhetoric does not make it so).

Schulte Nordholt, next, bolsters his argument with an account based in part on Mead [(1940) 1970: 340], which is hardly reassuring, of the reasons why scholars and others in the 1920s and 30s went to Bali and reported what they did. This mode of reasoning is not persuasive: the reasons why one writes what one does and what one writes are logically distinct. The former, however much a critic may be out of sympathy with them, cannot invalidate the latter, which stand or fall alone in face of the usual scholarly criteria of evidences, coherence, consistency, and so on.

Finally, Schulte Nordholt ignores the fact that, as Hobart puts it (1985: 50), “knowledge is built up from a plurality of perspectives ...”—an account of Balinese life in terms only of conflict and violence would distort it just as much as the accounts that Schulte
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Nordholt dismisses as misrepresentations. Those writers about Balinese life who do not emphasise conflict and violence, nor inherent or other kinds of contradiction, but who address such matters as are discussed above, do not misrepresent the form of Balinese life that they aim to understand;" but if a critic thinks that they do, they can be checked in the field and in the other ways that one employs to assess an ethnographical account. Their responses, rather, may be said to constitute evidences confirming the argument that is pressed above—that the Balinese form of life evinces most complexly and richly factors that are primary. They are so in the sense that they appear to be drawn upon by peoples everywhere in the attribution of order and meaning to their lives. These factors may be considered "the elementary constituents of culture" (Needham 1981: 3); they appear to be foci of attention to which the human psyche is primordially predisposed. Foreigners' reactions to the richness and complexity of Balinese life are as much evidences of these proclivities or constraints as the social facts of Balinese life, when they are seen in the global perspective that is characteristic of social anthropology and that contributes so much to the heuristic power of the subject.

FOOTNOTES

1 The data upon which the present essay is based were collected during the course of about 21 months field research in 1979–1981 in Pagutan, western Lombok. This work was funded by the Social Science Research Council of Great Britain and by awards from the Emslie Horniman Anthropological Scholarship Fund of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and from the Philip Bagby Memorial Fund, University of Oxford. I am greatly indebted to these bodies for their support. Unless it is specified or otherwise made clear, "Balinese" here refers to the Balinese of western Lombok, on whose form of life see Duff-Cooper (1983) and the studies listed under the present writer's name in the References to idem (1987).

2 By "ideology" is meant ideas and values in social action, not the decep-
tions purporting to nor the delusions of particular social classes, however defined (cf., Duff-Cooper 1987c).

3 It should be emphasised that this word does not refer to the modish view of hierarchy as "the encompassment of the opposite" (l'englobe-
ment du contraire) (e.g., Dumont 1980: 239-240).

4 See Needham (1973a) on "Prescription" and idem (1986) on "Alliance".

5 On this point, cf., Hobart who writes that "exchanges in Bali...tend to have both technical and symbolic aspects" (1979: 5) and (1980: 5)
that "a study of labour relations in Pisangkaja shows the extent to which supposedly 'economic' ties come to have more complex meanings
attached to them", contrary to the "wide-spread, if often implicit, tendency among social anthropologists to distinguish economic or political
ties from those which are thought to carry a heavier symbolic load". Hobart's latter formulation, of course, is not entirely satisfactory: it
postulates (all be it implicitly) a priority (temporal and/or logical) to "labour relations". Such a postulation is not justifiable on the evidence,
though it may of course be by some theory or other.

6 Balinese consists of words of varying degrees of fineness and coarseness (e.g., Kersten 1970: 13-25). When words are given in this way, the
word before the oblique is the fine (alus) form, the word after it, the
course (kasar) form.

7 At the place cited, Hocart asks: "How can we make any progress in
the understanding of cultures, ancient or modern, if we persist in
dividing what the people join and in joining what they keep apart?"

8 Pedanda Gdé Madé Karang, of the Gria Taman, Pagutan, my host and
mentor for the first eleven or so months of my time on Lombok, and
a Balian (medicine-man) of much repute. Pedanda Siva is the highest
status in Balinese life, and is properly concerned with what is high,
white, to the right, the east, and with other homologous entities of
life (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1985d: Tables 1-4).

9 It is, however, a little hard to reconcile the fact that while, as Geertz
puts it at the place cited, "to become either Christian or Muslim [is]
tantamount, in their [the Balinese's] eyes, to ceasing to be Balinese,...
and to have abandoned not just Balinese religion but Bali, and perhaps
reason, itself", with there being, in 1965, about 8,000 Catholics and
Protestants in Bali (Webb 1986: 94), assuming that at least some of
this number were originally Balinese. In Pagutan in 1980, there lived
six Catholics.

10 Hobart (1986: 25 n. 8) suggests that "it is simplistic to treat Sang
Hyang Widi as the autonym for 'the high god of the Balinese' (Duff-
Cooper 1985a: 71; 1985b: 129) because Balinese naming is a complex
matter. Divinity has different aspects with which Balinese villagers

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are concerned. It orders all aspects of the human condition as well as the non-social world”. He also writes (p. 11) that “Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Waśa is arguably Divinity as Order, what orders…”. It is unfortunate that in disparaging a fellow social anthropologist’s work, Hobart did not, it seems, feel it an encumbrance also to mention that in the studies that he cites here [as in others of which he, as the external examiner of my doctoral thesis (1983) has been sent offprints], Hobart’s explanatory remarks quoted above are implicit and have been put to regular and (I would claim) enlightening use in the analysis of social facts.

11 This literature is mostly concerned with exposing what a particular author, normally a Japanese, considers to be unique to the Japanese and their forms of life. It has been argued (Duff-Cooper: forthcoming-b) that many examples of this genre are more akin to the products of the imagination such as novels, plays, poetry, and dreams, than to sober scholarship which is orderly, systematic, and empirical. On the Nihon-jinron literature, see, e.g., Befu (1984) and Dale (1986).

12 Evans-Pritchard here writes: “It is extraordinary that anyone could have thought it worth while to speculate about what might have been the origin of some custom or belief, when there is absolutely no means of discovering, in the absence of historical evidence, what was its origin”. He also writes (1965: 111) that “it is not sound scientific method to seek for origins especially when they cannot be found. Science deals with relations, not with origins and essences”.

13 Lang is not alone in this view, of course: such diverse writers as Vico, in La Scienza nuova (Vico 1968), Pareto, in Trattato di sociologia generale (Pareto 1935), Gregory Bateson (1973: 114), and Foucault (1979: 67), appear to support Lang’s contentions about the relative importance of each of what he once called the two moods of men. In seeking for origins, the best writers’ work was premisised on them; not assuming anything to have occurred in the past that they did not have the evidence to suggest occurred when they were writing (e.g., Hocart 1970b: 3). It is therefore of relevance to note that the intellectualist assumption that most people cogitate most of the time is cast very much into doubt by, e.g., Needham (1978: 68–69; cf., Duff-Cooper 1985e: 239).

14 For a brief survey of the history of the Balinese on Lombok, see Duff-Cooper (1986c).

15 The three senior estates in decreasing order of fineness are Brahmana, Keatrya, and Vesia, also collectively called “Insiders” (Dalem). The “outsiders” (Jaba) are the fourth estate, Sudra, usually called Balinese people (Anak Bali) on Lombok.

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16. It may be mentioned, incidentally, that Schulte Nordholt's historical analysis, one of the conclusions of which is (1986b: 11) that "on numerous levels both [the aristocracy (sc. the three senior estates [n. 15] and the so-called "autonomous village"] maintained crucial contact with one another and [that] they are outside their mutual cohesion hardly comprehensible," gratifyingly supports the analytical position of the present writer (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1986f; 1987a: 115, 118-119 n. 23).

17. For an exegesis of and a commentary on these remarks, see, e.g., Needham (1985: 165-166).

18. To obviate possible misunderstanding, it is prudent here to reiterate that this approach is adopted because reliable and relevant historical evidences are not available, not because I entertain any structuralist or other bias against history, especially social history, the history of ideas, and the history of art—any more than I am biased against the other intellectual congener of social anthropology which include philosophy, the classics, theology (and particularly the ancillary of biblical studies), philology, and other non-mathematical kinds of humane study (cf., Needham 1981: 11-15).

19. "Axiom" comes from the Greek axiōma, that which is thought fitting, decision, self-evident principle; from axioûn, hold worthy, from áxios, worthy (Onions 1966: 66 s.v.).

20. On this topic, see Needham (1981: 74-78). Hobart, it is true, reports (1986: 26 n. 9) that "the more learned pemangku [village temple (pemaksan) priests and dalang (shadow puppeteers) of his acquaintance in Tegallalang, Bali]... treated collective representations about gods as subject to truth conditions." Clearly such people would not countenance the gods not existing; but it is unlikely that less learned villagers who were given to "flights of fancy" about the attributes which constitute the gods would do so either. In Tegallalang, it is to be supposed, one may argue or have flights of fancy about or otherwise give different accounts of the attributes that constitute the gods. On my experience of the Balinese, however, the existence of the gods is not likely to be a candidate for such attitudes. Indeed, if the Balinese of Lombok are anything to go by, without the questions that Hobart can be presumed to have raised, it seems unlikely that the matter of truth conditions and the flights of fancy would themselves have arisen; and perhaps (Hobart would have to confirm or deny this of course) the claims of the learned were to some extent at least a reaction to the challenges posed by the flights of fancy of villagers who, on their own admissions, were ignorant about the matters that they were discussing with the ethnographer.
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21 This and the other social facts addressed in this section are dealt with at length in Duff-Cooper (1983: esp., chap. V) and in other studies about the Balinese on Lombok.

22 For some reasons why this unity is called "female male" and not the more expectable "male female"—male is superior to female ultimately—see Duff-Cooper (1987f).

23 On Balinese aesthetics, see Duff-Cooper (1984a).

24 Schulte Nordholt remarks (1986a: 24) of his "speculative 'model' of three flows of water—which...shows a Balinese polity in which hierarchy structured the negara [realm] and in which the ruler played a central and active role" that it has "the advantage that it moves...". A criticism of the kind of "model" presented in the present essay and depicted in Duff-Cooper (1986a) is often that it is "static", that it is rigid, and that it cannot take account of conflict and contradiction. These criticisms, though, are very much in error: the modes of periodicity move, and can be shown to do so with the aid of three-dimensional computer graphics; and it shows the frame within which contradictions and conflict take place, and, in any case, when inconsistencies are pointed out, analogy and the system of association afford easy explanation. Nor is it rigid: it can, it is predicted, accomodate all indigenously defined aspects of Balinese ideology; while new cultural elements, so to say, can be also accomodated: "all the so called foreign 'elements' [such as the magic square of three of nuasen; the Barong mask used in some temple dances (Napier 1986: 206-233), both of which probably derive from China if from anywhere, as well as ideas and social practices from Java, India, and elsewhere] from...earlier or later periods are fixed with reference to [a] central point and conform to it" (Schaerer 1963: 3).

25 Hobart also suggests that "sekala and niskala do not constitute a dichotomy because the classes overlap in various ways...". My understanding of this differs from Hobart's: the ideological realms do constitute a dichotomy, but entities that are primarily assigned to one class may take on the characteristics appropriate to entities of the other classes at times. But this transition from one realm to the other can be accomplished only by gods or by people such as witches who are out-of-the-ordinary, at least from the point to view of normal (biasa) people who cannot, for instance, disappear at will or be in two places at once as gods and, e.g., some witches can. If the classes did not constitute a dichotomy, i.e., if the realms were not opposed, the ability to perform these actions would not be noteworthy—which they clearly are for many Balinese people.

26 Barnes is writing in an empirical mode, so to say, when he asserts
(1980: 93) that "certain groups of pairs in a given culture may be analogically associated, but they do not necessarily include all pairs found in that culture...". It is not obvious that within a given culture, at the extreme, any pair of opposites could be an analogue of any other such pair (cf., Needham 1980: 55), empirically-speaking. By contrast, formally speaking any two or more dyads in a given culture within which the same relation obtains are necessarily analogues one of another.

27 Another way of expressing this is the suggestion that the remark "to the effect that among primitives everything is sacred characterises Balinese life more aptly than the profane/sacred dichotomy" (Duff-Cooper 1985c: 18).

28 Hobart's observation (1986: 3) that "from different points of view there may be more than one opposite" is, of course, correct: it simply rephrases the elementary point that in the study of dual symbolic classification "to register a particular opposition does not imply [what might be false] that the contrast pertains to any context other than that in which it is demonstrated to be significant" (Needham 1973: xxv)" (Duff-Cooper 1985c: 32; cf., idem 1985d: 239; Needham 1985: 21).

29 On the notion of the FAS, see, e.g., De Josselin de Jong (1984; 1985) and Barnes (1985a; 1985b).


31 See Duff-Cooper (forthcoming-c) on this topic.

32 Rangda employs left-handed magic, as do witches, and has a tongue of fire that destroys everything in her path (cf., e.g., Napier 1986: 218 Plate 102, 219 Plate 103).

33 Hobart, for instance, appears to take a different view: he writes (1986: 4) that "If Modernism stresses systems and coherence of relations and Post-Modernism inherent contradiction..., the Balinese may have anticipated us in being Post-Modern!", i.e., in applying a mode of analysis to their own form of life (when asked to do so (see n: 20)] that happens to coincide with that favoured by Hobart. In a similar though perhaps more empirical vein, Schulte Nordholt writes (1985b: 13): "It goes without saying that we can deal summarily with the supposed static and harmonious situation in Balinese society before the advent of colonial rule. This was of course a complete fiction. Rather, the Balinese political system was characterized by a state of permanent conflict". It will be obvious that I cannot subscribe to what I take to be the extremeness of the views of both these writers, because they do not accord what I was taught about Balinese ideology by the people

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(Brahmana and Sudra) whom I lived with on Lombok; and because both seem to be swayed unduly by theoretical considerations which, to be frank, I find get in the way of the social facts. A synthesis of "Modernism" and "Post-Modernism" (as defined above) is more in consonance with Balinese life as I know it and have described it (e.g., Duff-Cooper 1983). This latter account, incidentally, is primarily concerned with what Hobart calls (1986: 19) the "world...of ordinary doings, misfortunes and pleasures...[the] condition of normality...people growing up, marrying, joining groups, going to play in or watch theatre...". One can only concur when he goes on to say: "What constitutes the normal is important and requires more consideration than it has received" (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1984a: 43 n. 44).

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