DESIGN OF MANIPULATION PREVENTING MECHANISM OF DEMAND FORECAST

• FUKUMOTO Jun-ya

  社団法人 土木学会 東京大学 大学院新領域創成科学研究科環境学専攻

• TSUCHIYA Kazuyuki

  社団法人 土木学会 三菱総合研究所 社会システム研究本部

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• 需要予測におけるマニピュレーション抑止の制度設計に関する研究
• ジュヨウ ヨソク ニ オケル マニピュレーション ヨクシ ノ セイド セッケイ ニ カンスル ケンキュウ

Abstract

Recently, it is severely criticized that the demand forecast of public investment has been manipulated by Japanese administration to justify the implementation of their projects. The aim of this paper is to design the mechanism which prevents the manipulation of demand forecast. Based on the contract theory, we formulate the principal-agent relationship in demand forecast. By solving this, we derive two optimal contracts. One is VOI reward scheme and the other is logarithmic scoring reward scheme. By examining this result, we derive some implications for the mechanism design of demand forecast.

Journal

• Doboku Gakkai Ronbunshu

  Doboku Gakkai Ronbunshu 2004 (772), 97-114, 2004-10-20

  Japan Society of Civil Engineers

Keywords

• demand forecast
• manipulation
• principal=agent
• value of information
• scoring rule

Details

• CRID: 1390001205602644224
• NII Article ID: 10013551700
• NII Article ID: 10013551679
• NII Book ID: AN10014020
• DOI: 10.2208/jscej.2004.772_97
• ISSN: 18827187
• ISSN: 02897806
• ISSN: http://id.crossref.org/issn/02897806
• NDL BIB ID: 7135366
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I7135366
• Web Site: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscej1984/2004/772/2004_772_97/_pdf
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• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed