Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks

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Abstract

An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. In INDOCRYPT2008, Yang and Zhang [26] proposed a new anonymous PAKE (NAPAKE) protocol and its threshold (D-NAPAKE) which they claimed to be secure against insider attacks. In this paper, we first show that the D-NAPAKE protocol [26]is completely insecure against insider attacks unlike their claim. Specifically, only one legitimate client can freely impersonate any subgroup of clients (the threshold <i>t></i>1) to the server. After giving a security model that captures insider attacks, we propose a threshold anonymous PAKE (called, TAP<i>+</i>+) protocol which provides security against insider attacks. Moreover, we prove that the TAP<i>+</i>+ protocol has semantic security of session keys against active attacks as well as insider attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and provides client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. Finally, several discussions are followed: 1) We also show another threshold anonymous PAKE protocol by applying our RATIONALE to the non-threshold anonymous PAKE (VEAP) protocol [23]; and 2) We give the efficiency comparison, security consideration and implementation issue of the TAP<i>+</i>+ protocol.

Journal

  • IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems

    IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems 94(11), 2095-2110, 2011-11-01

    The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers

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