Correlated Equilibrium in Network Formation and its Experiment

• Nishizaki Ichiro

  Graduate School of Engineering, Hiroshima University

• Hayashida Tomohiro

  Graduate School of Engineering, Hiroshima University

• Kambara Rika

  Graduate School of Engineering, Hiroshima University

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

• ネットワーク形成に対する関連均衡と実験
• ネットワーク ケイセイ ニ タイスル カンレン キンコウ ト ジッケン

Abstract

So far, it has been tried to explain the behavior on experimental subjects in experiments on network formation by a solution concept of the strict Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we consider the correlated equilibrium for network formation which is a solution concept based on stability in terms of expected payoff maximization assuming coordination or implicit agreement between players. To examine its validity, we conduct a laboratory experiment and try to explain the behavior of the experimental subjects. As a result of the experiment, we find that although the explanation by the strict Nash equilibrium is difficult, it is possible to explain by the correlated equilibrium or inequity aversion. <br>

Journal

• Transactions of the Institute of Systems, Control and Information Engineers

  Transactions of the Institute of Systems, Control and Information Engineers 25 (7), 163-171, 2012

  THE INSTITUTE OF SYSTEMS, CONTROL AND INFORMATION ENGINEERS (ISCIE)

Keywords

• network formation
• correlated equilibrium
• experiment

Details

• CRID: 1390282680142636544
• NII Article ID: 10031127444
• NII Book ID: AN1013280X
• DOI: 10.5687/iscie.25.163
• ISSN: 2185811X
• ISSN: 13425668
• NDL BIB ID: 023807972
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I023807972
• Text Lang: en
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • NDL
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed