Evolutionary Leader Game and Social Hierarchy

Access this Article

Search this Article

Author(s)

    • AKIYAMA Eizo
    • Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba

Abstract

This paper presents an evolutionary model of a population where individuals play a repeated Leader Game where two agents each has two options to choose, <i>D</i> (active/aggressive action: Daring, Dive) and <i>C</i> (passive action: Concede, Careful). The simulation results show that the evolutionary process for the Leader Game brings about a linear dominance hierarchy among strategy (automaton) classes. The author also investigates the robustness of the result against the perturbation of the game structure, the change of memory size of automata and the introduction of behavioral error.

Journal

  • SICE Journal of Control, Measurement, and System Integration

    SICE Journal of Control, Measurement, and System Integration 6(2), 102-107, 2013-03-31

    The Society of Instrument and Control Engineers

References:  14

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    10031159503
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AA12293218
  • Text Lang
    ENG
  • Article Type
    ART
  • ISSN
    18824889
  • Data Source
    CJP  J-STAGE 
Page Top