A Note on Capital Commitment and Cournot Competition with Labour-Managed and Profit-Maximising Firms

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Author(s)

Abstract

This paper shows that the discussion of Lambertini and Rossini (1998) as to the strategic investment levels oflabour-managed firms in alabour-managed (LM) duopoly is misleading. This is due to the fact that there is no duality between the conditions for maximisation andminimisation, and what is worse, an equilibrium needed for comparison is interior when the investment behaviour of the firms is discussed along the conventional method. We reconsider whether they overinvest or underinvest in R&D, employing a more general model with R&D spillovers. It is demonstrated that results obtained in the LM duopoly are similar to those in a conventional duopoly of profit-maximising firms.

Journal

  • Okayama economics review

    Okayama economics review 31(4), 949-966, 2000-03

    岡山大学経済学会

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    110000130035
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN00032897
  • Text Lang
    ENG
  • Article Type
    journal article
  • Journal Type
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    03863069
  • NDL Article ID
    5321952
  • NDL Source Classification
    ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL Call No.
    Z3-940
  • Data Source
    NDL  NII-ELS  IR 
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