A Note on Capital Commitment and Cournot Competition with Labour-Managed and Profit-Maximising Firms

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抄録

This paper shows that the discussion of Lambertini and Rossini (1998) as to the strategic investment levels oflabour-managed firms in alabour-managed (LM) duopoly is misleading. This is due to the fact that there is no duality between the conditions for maximisation andminimisation, and what is worse, an equilibrium needed for comparison is interior when the investment behaviour of the firms is discussed along the conventional method. We reconsider whether they overinvest or underinvest in R&D, employing a more general model with R&D spillovers. It is demonstrated that results obtained in the LM duopoly are similar to those in a conventional duopoly of profit-maximising firms.

収録刊行物

  • 岡山大学経済学会雑誌

    岡山大学経済学会雑誌 31(4), 949-966, 2000-03

    岡山大学経済学会

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    110000130035
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN00032897
  • 本文言語コード
    ENG
  • 資料種別
    journal article
  • 雑誌種別
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    03863069
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    5321952
  • NDL 雑誌分類
    ZD11(経済--経済学)
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z3-940
  • データ提供元
    NDL  NII-ELS  IR 
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