<論説>エティオピア戦争前夜の「地中海危機」について (2) : ムッソリーニと英伊関係 <Article>The Mediterranean Crisis on the Eve of the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935 (2)
The first three chapters of this study have been printed in the last issue of this journal, in which the author made it appear that since the spring of 1932 the Fascist Italy's designs for the Ethiopian conquest had gradually found a shape and that in the fall of 1934 Mussolini and his Ministries of Colony and Foreign Affairs as well as the Military Services had assumed that they would open war against Ethiopia within two years or so. He also showed that the leadership of the Italian government had regarded it as of primary importance for its foreign policy to obtain the British and French consent before the conquest. In the third chapter, he traced the development of Mussolini's negotiations with Great Britain and France in the first half of 1935 and found that Fascist Italy had hardly been able to obtain the British agreement. In the fourth and fifth chapters, the author examines the way in which Italy's image of Great Britain was confused through the summer of 1935 and how and why the relations between the two powers were growing more strained. The author's paper consists of following chapters : I. Introduction. II. Fascist Italy's Designs for the Ethiopian Conquest. III. Mussolini's Negotiations with Great Britain and France. IV. Change of Italy's Image of Great Britain-from Confusion to Confrontation. V. Anglo-Italian Tensions and Mussolini's Vacillasion. VI. The Brink and Escape from Collision. VII. The Structure of the Mediterranean Crisis-A Chicken Game. VIII. Conclusion.
法と政治 37(2), 279-315, 1986-06-30