エティオピア戦争前夜の「地中海危機」について(3・完) : ムッソリーニと英伊関係 <Article>The Mediterranean Crisis on the Eve of the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935 (3)
This is the third and last part of the author's paper on the Mediterranean crisis between Italy and Great Britain just prior to the outbreak of Mussolini's aggression of the Ethiopian Empire in the autumn of 1935. In the sixth chapter, entitled 'The Brink and Escape from Collision', the author describes, first, how the conflict escalated in mid-September after Foreign Minister Hoare made a speech before the League Assembly and the British naval power was reinforced in the Mediterranean, and then, how the Anglo-Italian dispute de-escalated at a fairly rapid rate in the end of September. In the seventh chapter, the author describes the structure of the Mediterranean crisis at its final stage as a game of 'chicken' for both sides, and explains why the participants of this crisis could reach a solution, temporary though it was, employing bargaining strategies through conciliatory influence efforts by each. The author's paper consists of following chapters : I. Introduction. II. Fascist Italy's Designs for the Ethiopian Conquest. III. Mussolini's Negotiations with Great Britain and France. IV. Change of Italy's Image of Great Britain-from Confusion to Confrontation. V. Anglo-Italian Tensions and Mussolini's Vacillations. VI. The Brink and Escape from Collision. VII. The Structure of the Mediterranean Crisis-A Chicken Game and Bargaining. VIII. Conclusion.
法と政治 38(4), 609-654, 1987-12-20