対話と想起 : プラトン哲学の「方法」(その二)

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  • 内山 勝利
    京都大学大学院文学研究科(西洋古代哲学史)教授

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タイトル別名
  • Dialogue and Anamnesis : An Introduction to the Method of Plato's Philosophy (Part 2)

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After considering some special intentions and characteristics of the dialogue-form of Plato's writings (Part 1 of this paper, already published), I now research the significance of his ‘anamnesis' doctrine, which, in my estimation, is very closely connected with the essentially dialectical structure of platonic philosophy, the tactic of which I tried to clarify in Part 1. I do not think that the ‘anamnesis' doctrine itself was, for Plato, a philosophical ‘method' in the proper sense, a method which would offer some concrete programme for knowledge. It is rather the undercoat, so to speak, laid on the great canvas for painting the philosophical picture of Plato. We can surely say that all facets of his thought, in their multilateral development, are elaborated on the basis of that doctrine. It gives him the decisive suggestion on where and how we are to find the ultimate knowledge investigated unsuccessfully throughout the earlier, socratic dialogues. In this second Part of my paper, I would like to concentrate my consideration just on the initial scene where Socrates brings up the ‘theory' that learning is nothing else than being reminded, i.e. at the Meno 82B ff., and then at the Phaedo 72E ff. On my understanding of the true meaning of these passages, this will give us a unified perspective on all aspects of the subsequent development of Plato's philosophy. The main points of my understanding of the anamnesis ‘theory' are---- (1) The ‘theory' is not raised only transcendentally, connected with the ‘myth' of the immortality of the soul; it is expressed as a practical ‘fact' which is apparently showed at processes of dialectical investigation performed under Socrates. Moreover, Socrates (Plato) has never presupposed it as an assumption to solve any epistemological problem. In this respect, it would not be an effective criticism of the theory to put a question on its metaphysical or epistemological ground. (2) The substantial meaning of anamnesis consists not only in guaranteeing the possibility of enquiring into unknown things, as is attested by the case of the slave-boy, but also in claiming to change the basic attitude toward the nature of our knowledge. This prima facie ‘optimistic' epistemology imposes on us actually a very hard demand; according to its new view of ‘learning', we cannot get knowledge by virtue of listening to others who already have it. It is, accordingly, not given from without by any means, but should be produced and brought up by oneself, being merely, but necessarily, detonated from without. (3) As is stated in the Phaedo (72E ff.), our sense-perception also has the same structure as learning, i.e. anamnesis, which is exercised in this case through ‘dialogues' with sensuous impressions. Here, using the case of ‘equality' as an appropriate example, Socrates is seemingly explaining that our judgement for sense-perception must have been acquired before our birth. But it must be said that the ‘proof' is not complete, and that Socrates knows the insufficiency well enough. If we examine the text carefully, we will notice that his real aim, here intended, is to exhort us to search the knowledge of Forms, especially in the realm of ethics, of which we apparently have no knowledge. He is saying, I think, that if and only if we can attain it, the proof of immortality, and even the anamnesis theory itself, will be truly guaranteed. (4) If so, the substantial meaning of anamnesis theory has to be equated with what Socrates says about the right way of education in the Republic VII, i.e. πεpιαѴωѴή τής ѱυχής (518D).

収録刊行物

  • 哲學研究

    哲學研究 569 1-22, 2000-04-10

    京都哲学会 (京都大学文学部内)

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詳細情報

  • CRID
    1390010765191510400
  • NII論文ID
    110000262175
  • NII書誌ID
    AN00150521
  • DOI
    10.14989/jps_569_1
  • HANDLE
    2433/273767
  • ISSN
    03869563
  • 本文言語コード
    ja
  • データソース種別
    • JaLC
    • IRDB
    • CiNii Articles
  • 抄録ライセンスフラグ
    使用不可

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