The Significance of Selective Interaction Models in the Evolutionary Game Theory

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  • 進化ゲームにおける選択的相互作用モデルの意義と課題
  • シンカ ゲーム ニ オケル センタクテキ ソウゴ サヨウ モデル ノ イギ ト カダイ

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Abstract

     To analyze how cooperation evolves, including the problem of social dilemma, a random-matching model in the evolutionary game theory does not work well. Instead of that, we have some models of selective interaction, which assume that players interact not with all members but with specific members in the population. Though selective interaction models consist mainly of a lattice model and a multilevel-selection model, we focus the latter to examine the theoretical foundation and the mathematical formation. As to the theoretical foundation, it is concerned with the well-known debate of unit of selection. We show that the multilevel-selection is consistent with the replicator selection if the concept of “vehicle” is introduced. There are two models of multilevel-selection, that is, extinction models and fission-fusion models. Although they are based on the different assumption about the reconstruction of groups, we argue that both of them have adequate phenomena to apply.

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