「寡きを患えず、均しからずを患う」? : グループの意思決定におけるパレート原理の作用  [in Japanese] Do people pursue distributive justice over social efficiency? : The functioning of Pareto optimality in group decision making  [in Japanese]

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Author(s)

Abstract

This paper addresses psychological dilemmas between pursuing distributive justice and sacrificing social efficiency in reward allocation. Previous research by Ohtsubo, Kameda, & Kimura (1996) showed that individuals often commit themselves to a specific distributive principle (such as equality or equity), endorsing a reward allocation scheme that is subjectively fairer but objectively inferior in terms of Pareto optimality. We have revisited this phenomenon in a reward allocation context by groups. Participants were first provided a scenario in which a group of people won a prize by collaboration, and were then asked to evaluate various reward allocation schemes as a neutral third party. Participants in the group condition discussed these schemes and made a collective recommendation in three-person groups. Participants in the individual condition made the identical decision alone. The results revealed that groups recommended a less fair, but Pareto-superior allocation scheme more often than individuals working alone. A follow-up experiment indicated that accountability of decisions to the beneficiaries underlies the enhanced role of Pareto axiom in group decision making.

Journal

  • Japanese Journal of Social Psychology

    Japanese Journal of Social Psychology 20(1), 26-34, 2004

    The Japanese Society of Social Psychology

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    110002785423
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN10049127
  • Text Lang
    JPN
  • ISSN
    0916-1503
  • NDL Article ID
    7040524
  • NDL Source Classification
    ZE1(社会・労働--社会科学・社会思想・社会学)
  • NDL Call No.
    Z6-2798
  • Data Source
    NDL  NII-ELS  J-STAGE 
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