EFFICIENT STRATEGY PROOF FAIR ALLOCATION ALGORITHMS

• Shioura Akiyoshi

  Tohoku University

• Sun Ning

  Shanghai Jiao Tong University

• Yang Zaifu

  Yokohama National University

Abstract

We study a fair division problem with indivisible objects like jobs, houses, and one divisible good like money. Each individual is to be assigned with one object and a certain amount of money. The preferences of individuals over the objects are private information but individuals are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities in money. It is shown that there exist efficient algorithms for eliciting honest preferences and assigning the objects with money to individuals efficiently and fairly.

Journal

• Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan

  Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan 49 (2), 144-150, 2006

  The Operations Research Society of Japan

Keywords

• Economics
• indivisibility
• fairness
• efficiency
• polynomial-time algorithms
• strategy proof

Details

• CRID: 1390282679086347776
• NII Article ID: 110004737675
• NII Book ID: AA00703935
• DOI: 10.15807/jorsj.49.144
• ISSN: 21888299
• ISSN: 04534514
• NDL BIB ID: 7947133
• Web Site: http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/7947133
• Web Site: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I7947133
• Web Site: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jorsj/49/2/49_KJ00004319985/_pdf
• Text Lang: en
• Data Source:
  • JaLC
  • NDL
  • Crossref
  • CiNii Articles
  • KAKEN
• Abstract License Flag: Disallowed