J.S.ミルの名辞・本質命題・定義について : 'denotation'と'connotation'をめぐるミルの意味論の予備的考察 Names, Essential Propositions and Definitions : Denotation and Connotation in J.S. Mill's Theory of Meaning

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(1) ミルの名辞論 : 指示(denotation)と含意(connotation)(2) ミルの本質命題,或いはverbal propositionsと定義についてJ.S. Mill's theory of meaning seems to be opposite to ones which leads us to philosophical solipcism. This can be seen apparently in his statement: 'What does any one's personal knowledge of things amount to, after subtracting all which he has acquired by means of the words of other people?' He insists, 'Names are names of things, not of our ideas of them'. According to him, terms can be devided into two types: nonconnotative names and connotative names. All names (terms) are names of something, i.e. denote something. A connotative term 'connotes', i.e. 'implies' or 'means' an attribute or a set of attributes of the thing denoted by the term, while he says that nonconnotative names have no connotation and therefore no meaning. For Mill, meaning of a term is its connotation, i.e. an attribute or a set of attributes of the thing denoted by the term, something objective, not something mental. I think we can say that Mill's intention in his System of Logic is to depsychologize the theory of meaning, though whether he has succeeded in it is problematic. In this paper, I would like to clarify his theory of meaning, in which 'denotation' and 'connotation' play important roles, and criticise it, sometimes referring to other philosophers like Husserl and Wittgenstein.

J.S. Mill's theory of meaning seems to be opposite to ones which leads us to philosophical solipcism. This can be seen apparently in his statement: 'What does any one's personal knowledge of things amount to, after subtracting all which he has acquired by means of the words of other people?' He insists, 'Names are names of things, not of our ideas of them'. According to him, terms can be devided into two types: nonconnotative names and connotative names. All names (terms) are names of something, i.e. denote something. A connotative term 'connotes', i.e. 'implies' or 'means' an attribute or a set of attributes of the thing denoted by the term, while he says that nonconnotative names have no connotation and therefore no meaning. For Mill, meaning of a term is its connotation, i.e. an attribute or a set of attributes of the thing denoted by the term, something objective, not something mental. I think we can say that Mill's intention in his System of Logic is to depsychologize the theory of meaning, though whether he has succeeded in it is problematic. In this paper, I would like to clarify his theory of meaning, in which 'denotation' and 'connotation' play important roles, and criticise it, sometimes referring to other philosophers like Husserl and Wittgenstein.

収録刊行物

  • 哲學

    哲學 101, 65-85, 1997-03

    慶應義塾大学

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    110007409352
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN00150430
  • 本文言語コード
    JPN
  • 資料種別
    Journal Article
  • 雑誌種別
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    05632099
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    4191428
  • NDL 雑誌分類
    ZH2(哲学・宗教--哲学)
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z9-205
  • データ提供元
    NDL  NII-ELS  IR 
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