Multi-Population Replicator Dynamics with Erroneous Perceptions

• KANAZAWA Takafumi

  Division of Mathematical Sciences for Social Systems, Department of Systems Innovation, Graduate School of Engineering Science, Osaka University

• USHIO Toshimitsu

  Division of Mathematical Sciences for Social Systems, Department of Systems Innovation, Graduate School of Engineering Science, Osaka University

抄録

In evolutionary game theory, to the best of our knowledge, individuals' perceptions have not been taken into consideration explicitly. When an individual interacts with the other individual under coexistence of heterogeneous sub-populations, the individual may be willing to change his/her strategy depending on the sub-population the other individual belongs to. Moreover, in such a situation, each individual may make an error about the sub-population the other individual belongs to. In this paper, we propose a multi-population model with such erroneous perceptions. We define an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and formulate replicator dynamics in this model, and prove several properties of the proposed model. Moreover, we focus on a two-population chicken game with erroneous perceptions and discuss characteristics of equilibrium points of its replicator dynamics.

収録刊行物

• IEICE transactions on fundamentals of electronics, communications and computer sciences

  IEICE transactions on fundamentals of electronics, communications and computer sciences 89 (10), 2857-2865, 2006-10-01

  一般社団法人電子情報通信学会

キーワード

• evolutionary game
• evolutionarily stable strategy
• replicator dynamics
• perception
• chicken game

詳細情報

• CRID: 1572543027451323520
• NII論文ID: 110007537765
• NII書誌ID: AA10826239
• ISSN: 09168508
• 本文言語コード: en
• データソース種別:
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