株式所有構造と利益マネジメント  [in Japanese] Structure of Shareholdings and Earnings Management  [in Japanese]

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Abstract

<p>本論文の目的は,「日本企業の株式所有構造の特徴である銀行支配,相互持合が,経営者の利益マネジメント行動にどのように影響を与えるのか」を理論的に説明することである.ゲーム理論の手法を用いて,経営者と株主をプレイヤーとする2期間モデルの分析を行った.分析結果は,次の2点に要約される.(1)日本企業は株式所有構造にかかわらず,一般に利益マネジメントを行う傾向がある.(2)株式所有構造によって日本企業の利益マネジメント傾向が異なり,最も強いのが株式相互持合企業,次に金融機関の支配力が強い企業,最も弱いのが特別な支配的株主をもたない企業ある.</p>

<p>The purpose of this paper is to theoretically explain the relationships between the characteristics of shareholdings in Japanese firms and earnings management. Using a method of game theory, we had two-period model analysis in which the players are a manager and a shareholder. The results are summarized as follows:</p><p>(1)Japanese firms tend to manage earnings regardless of the characteristics of shareholdings.</p><p>(2)The tendency of earnings management depends upon the characteristics of shareholdings. Firms whose main shareholders are mutual holding firms have the strongest tendency. The firms which are governed by banks have the second strongest. Those which are governed neither by mutual holding firms nor by banks have the weakest.</p>

Journal

  • The Journal of Management Accounting, Japan

    The Journal of Management Accounting, Japan 17(2), 3-21, 2009

    The Japanese Association of Management Accounting

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    110007629526
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AN10538994
  • Text Lang
    JPN
  • ISSN
    0918-7863
  • NDL Article ID
    10332329
  • NDL Source Classification
    ZD31(経済--企業・経営--会計・簿記)
  • NDL Call No.
    Z4-1414
  • Data Source
    NDL  NII-ELS  J-STAGE  NDL-Digital 
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