Mayor Term as a Determinant of Municipality Budget

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Abstract

論説(Article)

This paper investigates behavior of multi-term elected officials. Based on the tenure-ability linkage, long-serving, multi-term incumbents are hypothesized to have incentives to increase public resources under their control. This hypothesis is tested with budget data of municipalities in Japan. Results of regression analysis are consistent with the hypotheses regarding incentives of multi-term incumbents. Incumbent's additional term increases the municipality's expenditure per capita by 1.64% - 1.74% over the municipalities' average. This finding constitutes a significant policy implication in favor of adoption of term limits, since public policies under long-serving incumbents are biased to the direction of excessive presence of government activities

Journal

  • Doshisha University policy & management

    Doshisha University policy & management 14(1), 33-37, 2012-09

    Doshisha University

Codes

  • NII Article ID (NAID)
    110009471250
  • NII NACSIS-CAT ID (NCID)
    AA11408121
  • Text Lang
    ENG
  • Article Type
    departmental bulletin paper
  • Journal Type
    大学紀要
  • ISSN
    1880-8336
  • NDL Article ID
    024006606
  • NDL Call No.
    Z71-P636
  • Data Source
    NDL  NII-ELS  IR 
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