内集団ひいき行動の適応的基盤 : 進化シミュレーションを用いた検討 Adaptive foundations of in-group favoring behavior : An examination using evolutionary simulation

この論文にアクセスする

この論文をさがす

著者

抄録

When people behave more cooperatively toward in-group members than to out-group members, we call it "in-group favoring behavior." However, previous studies have not yet provided a satisfactory explanation for why in-group favoritism can be adaptive. In the current study, we conducted a series of simulations to explain such behaviors from an evolutionary perspective. We used the giving game and constructed a society composed of two groups, A and B. In the game, every player was given a fixed amount of resources and decided how much and to whom he gave. The results showed that the in-group favoring strategy is adaptive only when it has a strict criterion for recipients (not giving any resources to players who had helped other players who did not adopt the in-group favoring strategy). Furthermore, they showed that there were other strategies which have a strict criterion for recipients that could be adaptive as well. These findings suggest that strategies which form a circle of exchange only among themselves by excluding other strategies can be adaptive.

収録刊行物

  • 社会心理学研究

    社会心理学研究 29(2), 65-74, 2013

    日本社会心理学会

各種コード

  • NII論文ID(NAID)
    110009687143
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    AN10049127
  • 本文言語コード
    JPN
  • ISSN
    0916-1503
  • NDL 記事登録ID
    025085471
  • NDL 請求記号
    Z6-2798
  • データ提供元
    NDL  NII-ELS  J-STAGE 
ページトップへ