カマラシーラのディグナーガ批判 : 唯識性の理解を巡って [in Japanese]
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Śāntarakşita discusses the problem of "cognition-only" (vijñaptimātratā) in detail in the chapter bahirartha parīkşā of the Tattvasamgraha (TS), on which his direct disciple Kamalaśīla gives elaborate comments in his Tattvasamgrahapañjikā (TSP). The main purpose of this paper is to bring to light the fact that both Śāntarakşita and Kamalaśīla have a substantially different idea on vijñaptimātratā from Dignāga and that Kamalaśīla explicitly attacks him, citing Dignāga's own work. On the basis of an analysis of this chapter, especially of the TS 2083 and the TSP thereon, the present writer has reached the following preliminary conclusions. I. Śāantarakşita criticizes in the TS 2083 the view that a grasped part of cognition (grāhyāmśa) is established as an object when a certain potential power (śakti) exists in an immediately preceding cognition. Kamalaśīla identifies it with Dignāga's view as expressed in his Ālambanaparīkşā (ĀP) 6, 7b and his own Vŗtti (ĀPV) ad ĀP 7b. Dignāga maintains that a cognition has in itself two forms, i.e. "the grasper" and "the grasped" (grāhya-grāhaka). Accordingly Dignāga's theory of dvirūpatā of cognition is criticized here implicitly by Śāntarakşita and explicitly by Kamalaśīla, both of whom depend upon the traditional advaya (cf. TS 2079) theory of the Yogācāra-philosophy. II. The word "ālaya" occurs once in this chapter of the TSP (p. 582.19), but never in that of the TS itself. In the present writer's view, this does not necessarily mean that Kamalaśīla positively supports this concept; it may be that he was simply influenced by the Vinītadeva's interpretation as found in his Ālambanaparīkşāţīkā (ĀPŢ). For this assumption we may adduce a few more parallel passages between the TSP and the ĀPŢ. III. The TSP speaks of two contradictions, i.e. pratītibādhā (the contradiction with what is experienced [by ordinary people]) and abhyupetabādhā (the contradiction with what is accepted [in a holy scripture of one's own system of thought]), which would arise in negating an external object in every way. They are also referred to in the ĀPŢ and in the Dharmapāla's commentary on ĀP/ĀPV (『觀所縁論釋』), but not in the ĀP/ĀPV itself. This, too, seems to suggest a close relationship between Kamalaśīla and the commentators of the ĀP/ĀPV; at the same time we should not overlook a methodological difference between them in evading the possibility of these two contradictions. The commentators try to solve these difficulties by regarding a grasped part of cognition (grāhyāmśa) as an object (ālambana), though they, following Dignāga, do not acknowledge the necessity of establishing an external object as the ālambana. Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, accepts an external object on the level of ordinary experience (samvŗtti) just like ordinary people (loka), and a holy scripture (sūtra) which enunciates a external object, but he negates it on the level of ultimate reality (paramārtha). Undoubtedly, he relies upon the theory of satyadvaya (twofold truth) for this solution. This is extremely important, because this suggests that his philosophical position in the TSP is in line with that of Sautrāntikas on the level of samvŗtti, whereas it agrees with that of the Yogācāras on the level of paramārtha.
インド哲学仏教学研究 (3), 17-32, 1995-10-31